

## GERMANY

*Jeremy Noakes*

On the outbreak of war in September 1939 Germans on the home front were faced with a dual task: to mobilize the nation's resources for the war effort to maximum effect, while simultaneously maintaining the morale of the civilian population in order to sustain a consensus for war. The two tasks were closely interrelated: the methods used for resource mobilization were bound to react on morale, while in turn morale would crucially influence the success of resource mobilization. However, they were also inherently contradictory: the requirement to switch resources from civilian to military needs was bound to place additional burdens on the civilian population with consequent deleterious effects on morale. Thus, the regime had to try and square a circle: to mobilize maximum resources without at the same time undermining morale. Civilian morale in war was a particularly sensitive issue for the Nazi regime. The German revolution and defeat of November 1918 had been a traumatic event for Hitler and, as he repeatedly asserted, he was determined to prevent another November 1918.<sup>1</sup> In this at least he and his regime were successful. There was no revolution. The Nazi regime only collapsed after total defeat and military occupation.

Hitler had been preparing for war since achieving power in January 1933 and doing so with the full support of the German elites. The pre-war years had seen the German economy more thoroughly geared to war than those of the other belligerents. Only in Japan and the USSR was the proportion of net national product devoted to personal consumption lower than in Germany during the late 1930s, and Germany had produced far more combat munitions between 1935 and 1939 than any other power and as much in real terms as her future enemies combined.<sup>2</sup> Between 1936 and 1939, the regime had introduced a whole battery of measures with which to direct the economy – controls over investment, raw material alloca-

tion, prices, wages, and the direction of labour. However, Germany was very far from having an economy geared to total war by 1939. There was no rationing, labour conscription was still being used sparingly, and a large amount of resources was being poured into prestige building projects to glorify the regime and its various organizations.

A consensus is now emerging among historians that the failure fully to mobilize the German economy for war by 1939 was not the product of a coherent strategy of Blitzkrieg, although there is disagreement about the regime's effectiveness in mobilizing the economy for war between 1936 and 1942.<sup>3</sup> However, it did not consciously intend to limit rearmament. Such limitation was rather the result of a combination of political pressures and serious flaws in the administrative structures of German economic mobilization. On 23 May 1939, Hitler informed the Commanders-in-Chief of the *Wehrmacht* and their chiefs of staff: 'All armed services and governments must try to secure a short war. However, the Government has to prepare for a war of ten or fifteen years duration.'<sup>4</sup> Following this line, the regime appears to have operated on the simple principle of 'producing as much and as quickly as possible'. However, the effectiveness of German rearmament was seriously undermined by a lack of coordination and coherent planning. Control was divided between the *Wehrmacht*, which was responsible for the armaments sector as such, and the Economics Ministry which was responsible for other sectors of the economy which were significant for rearmament. The result was damaging friction between the two. Moreover, the various branches of the *Wehrmacht* found it impossible to coordinate their demands on the economy, with each section of the armed forces going its own way under constant pressure from the Führer to expand. The result was a war of all against all.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, political concern about morale prevented the regime from imposing tough measures such as the closing down of parts of the consumer sector or the imposition of rationing.

The result of all this economic activity was that the economy was overloaded.<sup>6</sup> Already, at the start of 1939, industry reported that firms were operating at a level of between 10 and 20 per cent beyond their capacity depending on the extent to which the particular branch was involved in rearmament. The result was a repeated slipping of delivery dates, which had a knock-on effect since many firms were sub-contractors. The biggest bottle-neck was labour. By 1939, it was estimated that Germany was short of one million workers with mining and, above all, agriculture most seriously affected. This resulted in competition between employers for scarce labour which, despite wage controls, led to an increase in wages. Given the difficulty of expanding the consumer goods sector to meet rising demand, while simultaneously increasing rearmament, this development had serious inflationary

implications. Above all, the issue of labour was the one where the two issues of resource mobilization and popular morale were most intimately related and it is, therefore, the aspect of resource mobilization on which this paper will concentrate.

With the outbreak of war in September 1939, the regime hoped to be able to use the emergency as an excuse to bring the economy under control and at last gear it fully to the needs of war. This objective lay behind the War Economy Decree of 4 December 1939.<sup>7</sup> It was intended to impose sacrifices on the population by cutting wages and increasing taxes, measures which would be partially offset by a reduction in prices. The decree abolished all bonuses for overtime, night shift and Sunday working, ordered the fixing of maximum wage rates in all branches of industry, and introduced a war tax affecting some forty per cent of all industrial workers. In addition, the decree suspended all holiday rights and proposed an increase in tax on luxury items. The aim was to reduce the earnings of German industrial workers by approximately ten per cent, which was intended to be matched by an equivalent reduction in prices in all sectors of the economy apart from agriculture. At the same time, the regime exploited the opportunity to extend the programme of civil labour conscription which had been introduced in 1938. Before the war, 800,000 workers had already been conscripted, of whom 400,000 were involved in the construction of the so-called West Wall. Now, between 1 and 12 September 1939, another 500,000 workers were conscripted and deployed where the labour shortage was most acute.<sup>8</sup> Finally, the Ministry of Labour suspended the legal limits on hours of work.

Within a matter of weeks, however, the Government found itself obliged to reverse its tough measures. Between mid-November 1939 and January 1940, they had virtually all either been revoked or drastically modified. The Government had been forced to backtrack on its hard-line programme because of a campaign of passive resistance to its measures by the workforce.<sup>9</sup> The workers' resentment found expression in increased rates of absenteeism and a decline in productivity. Their protest was taken up by Nazi Party and Labour Front officials who were concerned about a deterioration in morale; and it even met with a sympathetic response from some employers worried about deteriorating productivity. Hitler himself had intervened to insist that newly conscripted workers must be employed in firms near their homes since it was impossible to compel workers to live separated from their families. The number of conscripted workers reached a peak in January 1940 of 1.4 million, declining thereafter to 0.68 million in October 1942.

The withdrawal of its hard-line programme out of concern for workers' morale left the Government's labour strategy in some disarray. There were two main problems: 1) an overall labour shortage made increasingly acute by continuing

conscription into the Army. Between May 1939 and May 1940, 4.3 million Germans were conscripted into the *Wehrmacht*, of whom over 900,000 came from industry, representing about ten per cent of the industrial work force. 2) The need to transfer labour to those sectors of the economy which were vital to the war effort from those that were not so vital.

To take the second point first: As part of its softer line, the Government had replaced the attempt to reduce wages by a wage freeze. However, by freezing wage rates, the regime had forfeited a mechanism for the reallocation of labour which was to prove highly effective in Britain and, above all, the United States, namely the operation of the market with high wages in the armaments sector attracting labour from other parts of the economy.<sup>10</sup> Furthermore, the problem was compounded by the running down of civil conscription as an alternative tool of labour allocation. In place of these two more effective methods, the regime was obliged to adopt inadequate substitutes – notably the so-called ‘combing through’ of businesses by roving commissions looking for surplus or inefficiently employed labour and the closing down of businesses which were deemed inessential to the war effort.<sup>11</sup> The problem with these methods was that employers understandably tended to resist the loss of their labour and the closure of their businesses and, what is more, often received support from the local Nazi Party officials who were either concerned at the consequent damage to the local economy or ideologically committed to the maintenance of small business or both. As a result, such attempts at rationalization of the labour supply proved relatively ineffective. This in turn inevitably made the overall problem of the labour shortage even more acute.

During 1939-41, this situation did not become critical, mainly because the military campaigns were brief and maximum armament production was not in fact required. Indeed, during 1939 and 1940, British armament production was running at a higher level than that in Germany. This was not so much a conscious policy of Blitzkrieg for, during 1939-40, Hitler pressed for a huge armaments’ programme. Only the Russian campaign of 1941 was planned as a Blitzkrieg. It was more the result of a continuation of the administrative weaknesses – above all, the lack of coordination and coherent planning – which had bedevilled the pre-war rearmament programme. These weaknesses could only be tolerated because of Germany’s military success.

With the reverse in front of Moscow in December 1941, however, the crisis had arrived. It was now apparent that Germany was engaged in a two-front war against major powers which would be likely to last some time. The new situation required a complete overhaul of the administration of the rearmament programme. Above all, as the eastern front gobbled up more and more manpower the labour shortage

became critical. In September 1941, there were already more than 2.6 million vacancies – half in agriculture, 50,000 in the mines, and more than 300,000 in the metal industries. And things were going to get worse. Between late May 1942 and September 1944, a further 3.6 million Germans were to be drafted into the *Wehrmacht*. Between February 1942 and January 1945, 687,000 protected (UK) workers were conscripted from the armaments industry alone.<sup>12</sup>

In January 1942, Hitler responded to this crisis by appointing the Gauleiter of Thuringia, Fritz Sauckel, to the new post of Reich Commissioner for Labour Mobilization. Sauckel was immediately confronted with the problem of where the additional workers were to come from. One solution was a more vigorous enforcement of the combing through and closure programmes, which this time included government and party agencies. However, although this proved slightly more successful than before, it only produced a few hundred thousand redeployed workers, when what was needed was millions of new workers. The question was: where were they to come from? The regime endeavoured to fill the labour gap by tapping two main sources of new labour: the first, and by far the most important, was foreigners – POWs and foreign workers recruited either voluntarily or by force; the second was German women.

Even before the outbreak of war, the regime had tried to fill the labour gap by recruiting foreign workers – Poles, in particular – to work on the land.<sup>13</sup> Now, Sauckel replaced the predominantly voluntary recruitment practised hitherto by ruthless press-ganging. By 1944, there was a total of 7.6 million foreign workers in the Greater German Reich, 5.7 million of them civilians, 1.9 million POWs. One third of the civilians were women, of whom 87 per cent came from the East. Of the male civilians 62 per cent came from the East. According to some figures, by 1944 one in four of all those employed was a foreign worker. In agriculture the figure was one in two. Indeed, in eastern Germany there were large rural areas where there were twice as many foreign workers as male German workers. In the mining, construction and metal-working industries the figure was one in three. By August 1944, 38 per cent of the miners in the Ruhr were foreign. By that date there were 400,000 foreign workers in Berlin alone – 10 per cent of its population. All over Germany there were foreign labour camps.

In fact, the decision to recruit foreign labour on a massive scale was not an easy option for the regime to take. There was very considerable opposition from the Party and the SS to the idea of importing large numbers of foreign workers into Germany, particularly Poles and Russians who were considered racially inferior. In the end an implicit bargain was reached: the Party and the SS accepted the arguments of the technocrats in the Armaments and Labour Ministries on the need for foreign

labour. In return, the Party and SS were able to insist on a policy of ruthless discrimination and vicious discipline, particularly with the Russians and Poles. There was in fact a hierarchy among the foreign workers, with West Europeans at the top, who were treated not very differently from German workers in terms of pay and conditions, though they were clearly subordinate to the Germans, to the Poles and Russians at the bottom who were treated appallingly.

How then did the German workers respond to this influx of foreign labour? It is in fact difficult to generalise about the relations between the German and foreign workers.<sup>14</sup> There were cases of brutality by German foremen and supervisors, particularly in the mines, but there were also cases of generosity by German workers, providing food for example. The majority response of German workers appears to have been indifference. Much depended on circumstances – on the particular employer or on whether or not the foreign worker had particular skills. Thus, where foreign workers had skills and performed them well they were sometimes integrated to some extent into the shop floor community.

People's actual experience of workers from the Soviet Union tended to undermine the propaganda stereotypes of the Nazis. Thus, the Nazi Security Service (SD) reported in August 1942:

The people of the Soviet Union have been portrayed as animals, as bestial. The commissar and the Politruk are regarded as the epitome of subhumanity. The reports about atrocities in the first months of the eastern campaign confirmed the opinion that the members of the enemy army were beasts. People were concerned about what could be done with these animals in the future. Many compatriots thought they should be ruthlessly exterminated. In view of the reports about atrocities committed by escaped Russian POWs, there was some concern that these types could come to the Reich in large numbers and even be employed as labour. But now many compatriots contrast this view with the qualities of intellect and character of the thousands of eastern workers. Workers, in particular, note that these Russians are often quite intelligent, fit in easily, are quick at understanding even quite complicated mechanical processes. Many learn German quickly and are often by no means badly educated. These experiences have undermined their previous image of the people from the East.<sup>15</sup>

There was, however, an insidious aspect to this presence of foreign workers, namely the way in which German workers became involved willy nilly in the racist policy of the Government by the very fact that they adapted to their position as supervisors of a helot population of foreign workers. For some Germans it meant, in effect, promotion. As far as the Nazis were concerned, this had the political benefit of adjusting the Germans to their future role as the superior beings in a post-war 'New Order' in Europe, for which the hierarchy within the foreign labour force provided a useful model.

Despite the appalling wastage of human resources involved, particularly through the virtual starvation of workers from the Soviet Union (quite apart from the inhumanity of their treatment), the Nazi programme of employing foreign labour was undoubtedly an economic success from the German point of view. They formed a crucial part of the German home front and without them Germany would have been unable to continue fighting beyond 1941. Moreover, the extensive employment of foreign labour enabled many Germans to avoid having to perform the hardest and most unpleasant jobs. Thus there was no need for Bevin boys in the mines in Germany; the job was done by Poles or Russians. Finally, the use of foreign labour enabled the regime to refrain from using draconian measures of conscription on women, at any rate until the last stage of the war.

The increased employment of women was the obvious other alternative to foreign labour as a means of closing the labour gap. Attention has often been drawn to the relative failure to recruit German women for the war effort, particularly by comparison with Britain and the United States.<sup>16</sup> However, this interpretation has recently been challenged by Richard Overy who has argued that the concentration on the employment of women in industry (or lack of it) has meant that the extent of the employment of women in other sectors of the economy – on the land or in family businesses – has been overlooked.<sup>17</sup> He claims that in fact more women were employed in Germany than in Britain during the war and that the role of female employment in these sectors made a crucial contribution to the war economy and placed major restraints on the extent to which they could be mobilized for industry.

This is an important corrective. Nevertheless, it is questionable whether it entirely refutes the argument that Germany was less successful at mobilising women into industry, particularly the armaments' sector, than Britain or the United States. For, this argument is not simply an *ex post facto* construction by historians trying to prove the existence of a Blitzkrieg strategy for the years 1939-1942. Rather, it forms a constant refrain among the German officials involved in trying to bridge the labour gap in industry and in the SD reports of popular opinion, particularly among those women who were employed in industry. On 16 February 1944, Field Marshall Erhard Milch, one of the key figures in the War Economy, concluded that there had been 'a total failure in the mobilisation of German women for employment in the armaments' sector.'<sup>18</sup> It was only in December 1944, for example, that systematic attempts were made to train women for armaments work and it was only then that women began to be used for aircraft production.<sup>19</sup> By comparison, in the United States women made up 39 per cent of the labour force in aircraft factories, in the United Kingdom it was 40 per cent.<sup>20</sup> How then did this situation come about?

At the outbreak of war women were already subject to civil conscription on the same terms as men under the legislation of June 1938 and February 1939.<sup>21</sup> However, the authorities were even more cautious of conscripting women than men for fear of its impact on morale, and up to June 1940 only about 250,000 women had been conscripted, all of whom were already in work, i.e. they were simply being transferred to other work. In fact, the most striking development in German female employment after the outbreak of war was its sharp fall. Whereas in Britain the number of women in regular employment rose by 10 per cent between June 1939 and March 1940, in Germany the number of women in insured employment fell by 540,000, 300,000 of whom left work between October and December 1939.

The main reason for this fall was the introduction of generous family support allowances for the families of men who had been called up into the armed forces. The authorities were very mindful of the negative effects on morale in the First World War of the inadequate support given to such families. So now they fixed that the wives of combatants would receive up to 85 per cent of their husbands' previous wages plus other benefits such as rent allowances and free health insurance. The average allowance received was in fact 73-75 per cent of former earnings. This compared with 38 per cent in the United Kingdom and 36 per cent in the United States. Women who earned more than one third of the amount of their family allowance had it deducted from the allowance.

The allowance scheme had initially included a stipulation that all recipients should demonstrate that they were taking steps to contribute to their own living expenses, i.e. it was envisaged more as a top-up arrangement. But within weeks of the outbreak of war the authorities had back-tracked and removed this stipulation. The result was that most soldiers' wives who could afford to give up employment did so. They considered the extra money which they could earn above their allowance, i.e. one third, marginal in view of the fact that there was virtually nothing to buy with the money saved. Moreover, by working they subjected their clothes and shoes to excess wear and tear at a time when there was a serious shortage of these commodities. They also increased their calorie consumption at a time of food rationing. This phenomenon of women leaving employment in droves was exacerbated by a boom in war marriages followed by a baby boom. This was encouraged by the Nazi Party agencies on grounds of population policy. Indeed Rudolf Hess publicly encouraged unmarried girls to 'present the Führer with a baby'.<sup>22</sup> But the authorities responsible for labour deployment believed that some of these young women were simply marrying in order to be eligible for family allowances.

Women who had previously worked but had left the work force on the outbreak of war were eventually forced back to work by an unpublished decree issued by

Göring on 20 June 1941.<sup>23</sup> However, in general, the years 1940-1944 were marked by the largely unsuccessful attempts of the officials of the Ministry of Labour, the Nazi Labour Front, Sauckel, and even the Propaganda Ministry, to introduce a tougher line on the mobilisation of women. At last, in January 1943, under the impact of the defeats of Stalingrad and El Alemain, the regime introduced a decree which obliged all women aged between seventeen and forty-five and all men between sixteen and sixty-five to report to their local labour office if they were not already in the armed forces or in full-time employment.<sup>24</sup> Exceptions were made for pregnant women or those who had a child under school age or two children under the age of fourteen. By the end of June 1943, 3,048,000 women had registered with the Labour Office. However, of these only 500,000 women were still in employment in December 1943. Six hundred thousand had secured their release through official channels; many simply abandoned employment without notifying the authorities. Others fixed up cushy office jobs for themselves through their connections. The Labour Offices were more or less powerless to prevent this because their guidelines insisted on kid gloves treatment for women.

We have already noted one of the two main reasons for this relative failure to mobilize German women into the armaments sector – the availability of foreign workers. Foreign workers were generally stronger and had more skills than German women, particularly those not yet employed who tended to be middle-class women unused to factory employment. Certainly they were generally preferred by German employers for whom they had the benefit of being generally cheaper and not subject to the same restrictions on hours of work and types of employment as were German female workers and not requiring special facilities. Having said that, British middle-class women *were* conscripted into factory work. For example, the author's two unmarried aunts, hitherto ladies of leisure, worked for the Handley Page bomber factory in north London from 1943 to 1945, the one as a riveter and the other as her mate!

This was a scenario to which Hitler had strong objections and it was these objections which formed the other main reason. He was influenced by a combination of concerns: firstly, morale—both of husbands and fathers at the front who would object to the conscription of their wives and mothers and of the civilian population at home on whom female conscription would impose an additional burden.<sup>25</sup> Secondly he had racist, sexist, and class objections.<sup>26</sup> A woman who had not been brought up to work in a factory would do more politically for the morale of the population if she looked after her family at home than if she worked in a factory where she would only cause problems. The subjection of middle-class women to a crude factory environment would inflict moral damage. Conscription into industry

would cause biological damage and adversely affect women's prime function as mothers.

Until September 1944, Hitler even opposed the conscription of housemaids. For most of the war it was possible for a household to have several domestic servants. Thus, while in Britain the number of domestic servants dropped from 1.2 million to 400,000, in Germany it only went down from 1.56 million to 1.36 million. Overy's point that domestic servants were often not servants as such, but part of a family business has some force.<sup>27</sup> However, he does not take account of the fact that those responsible for labour mobilisation clearly believed that a tougher line should be taken, but were blocked by Hitler who argued not on grounds of economic rationality but from prejudice. He insisted that Germany was not a Communist state and told Sauckel to 'import 100,000 healthy and strong female Ukrainians' instead.<sup>28</sup> In the spring of 1944, Sauckel told Speer that he had repeatedly asked Hitler for powers 'à la Stalin' for the mobilization of female labour but that Hitler had refused with the argument that the 'slim and long-legged German women' could not be compared with the 'dumpy, primitive and healthy Russian women'.<sup>29</sup>

The failure until the last stages of the war to adopt a policy of systematic conscription for women and the restriction of coercive measures to those women who had previously worked, while many of those who had never worked before were able to escape work or find congenial or token employment had serious repercussions on the morale of the female labour force. This is clear from the reports of the SD. For example, the SD reported in August 1941 the comments of female factory workers from Dortmund, who had been recalled to work by the secret Göring decree aimed at those who had left work at the beginning of the war as a result of the introduction of family allowances:

We can understand that it's necessary for us to go back to work. It will cause us some unpleasant difficulties but there's a war on and we want to do our bit. But why is Frau Director S not conscripted along with her servants. Her little four-year-old son could spend the day in the NSV Kindergarten just like our children. Furthermore, she would learn the simple techniques in the factory just as quickly as we do. Why is there not equal treatment for all compatriots? The wealthy ladies who did not need to work before are now once again being protected. If that does not change then we shall simply go on sick leave from time to time. Nothing will happen to us.<sup>30</sup>

The point about going on sick leave was an important one. Work discipline among the female workforce was notoriously bad with widespread and persistent absenteeism. This was often not so much a protest against the regime but rather a response to the intolerable burdens placed on working women, many of whom were also obliged to fulfill duties as housewives and mothers in a war situation where such

duties were even more onerous than usual. The authorities were aware of this situation and loath to take tough measures against such breaches of discipline. On 13 November 1940, the Ministry of Labour emphasized 'the fear of producing an unfavourable popular response through the harsh treatment of women who are unwilling to work'.<sup>31</sup> The women soon became aware of this as is clear from the woman's comment in the SD report. In fact, the SD showed considerable sympathy for the women's situation. Another report dated 17 August 1942, for example, noted:

The mood has become tenser as a result of the difficult food situation and the length of the war. It's understandable that women whose men have not been on leave for twelve to nineteen months are not in the best of spirits. One should also not ignore the fact that, after the end of their shift, women still have their household duties to attend to, which are now more onerous than in normal times. In addition, there are worries about the husband at the front so that enough explosive material has been stored up which is liable to detonate if their request for a day off etc. is not respected. Then all warnings and references to the needs of the hour meet with an icy silence.<sup>32</sup>

The problem was that the authorities had no real answer to the complaints of the women about the injustice of their treatment. According to the same SD report:

The greatest difficulties are faced by the colleagues from the Party and the Labour Front, particularly those who give speeches, who are continually being asked in the factories why one class of women is overburdened while the other is not called upon to make any sacrifices. There is no satisfactory answer to this question since those involved can only refer to the fact that the Führer continues to expect the voluntary commitment of all women. Even the best speakers and propagandists who have continually been calling for efficiency and self-sacrifice have now gradually lost the confidence of the retinue [the Nazi word for the workforce] because they have either had to remain silent in response to this question, which damages the prestige of the Party, or their explanations have lacked uniformity from which the population believes it can deduce the uncertainty of the leadership regarding this question.<sup>33</sup>

What effects did the war have on the millions of women who nevertheless did work? First, the shortage of males forced the regime to modify its ideological principles somewhat as far as the employment of professional women was concerned.<sup>34</sup> During the first years after 1933, professional women had been discriminated against; now they were welcomed back, though they were still excluded from certain spheres, notably the legal profession. Also far more female students were admitted. The regime felt that highly qualified women would be needed as a stop-gap until the number of qualified males, depleted by the war, had been made up again by a new generation of post-war male students.

Secondly, the war saw a shift towards employment in the service industries and administration.<sup>35</sup> The key factor in this shift from blue to white collar employment was the superior pay and status associated with white collar jobs. Women in office jobs were favoured because male office workers were drafted and, unlike in blue-collar jobs, few foreign substitutes could be employed. The result was that a twenty-two year old single typist in a coal mining firm earned 25 per cent more than a face worker with a family.

Generally, of course, women continued to be paid less than men. Equal pay was introduced in the public sector in September 1939 for women who worked in the same job as men achieving the same performance, a job which was particularly responsible or physically demanding.<sup>36</sup> However, private employers were generally hostile and in the private sector – with the exception of certain piece-rate jobs in particular industries – most women were paid 20-25 per cent less than men.

Although sensitive to the need not to upset wage stability or antagonize male workers, some agencies in the regime were sympathetic to a move towards more equal pay for women, particularly during the last phase of the war when the need to attract women into work made it particularly desirable. In April 1944, Sauckel pleaded with Hitler for equal pay for equal work but he vetoed it. It clearly went against his male chauvinist principles and he no doubt feared male reaction from the shop floor and also from employers. He replied:

The only possibility of removing existing hardships and injustices is for us to win the war so that we reach a position in which all German women and girls can be removed from all jobs which we must regard as unwomenly, which undermine the birthrate, and threaten the family and the nation.<sup>37</sup>

Finally, much was done to protect women workers - more indeed than in the United States or the United Kingdom, where there were far fewer restrictions on what work women could do.<sup>38</sup> Hours of work for women were initially restricted to 48 per week, later raised to 51 in 1942 and then to 56 in 1944 – each time four or five hours less than for men. Night shifts were restricted, whereas in the United States 50 per cent of women were on night shift in 1943. In May 1942, a Mothers' Protection Law was passed which, apart from granting six weeks maternity leave before and after birth, insisted on the provision of creches and nursing rooms in all firms which employed substantial numbers of women. In the United States federally-funded care centres cared for only 120,000 children at their peak in 1944. By contrast, in Germany there were 32,000 creches by 1944, which cared for 1,200,000 children.<sup>39</sup> However, this commitment to women's health and well-being reflected the regime's ideological concern with motherhood as much or more than the need to attract and keep women in the labour force.

As we have seen, the relatively soft line taken by the regime towards female labour mobilization – at any rate up to 1943 – was motivated in large part by concern for morale. At the same time, the ability to take this soft line was in turn dependent on the extensive use of foreign labour. Labour, however, was not the only resource which Nazi Germany was able to plunder from its empire, though it was probably the most crucial. Supplies of raw materials were also important as were – most significant from the point of view of the home front – food supplies.<sup>40</sup> Between 1939 and 1944, Germany imported large amounts of foodstuffs from her empire. In addition, her occupation armies largely lived off the land where they were stationed, a fact which helped to compensate for the burden of feeding the foreign workers employed in Germany. Ironically, she acquired far more from Western Europe than from the putative *Lebensraum* in the East. This was achieved at the expense of the consumption of the occupied territories. These imports enabled the regime to sustain significantly higher levels of food supplies than had been the case in the First World War.<sup>41</sup>

Food shortages had played a crucial role in the deterioration of morale in World War I, when the horrors of the 'turnip winter' of 1916 and the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people through the effects of malnutrition had imposed intolerable burdens on the German people. Moreover, as, if not more, important than the shortages had been the sense of injustice at the inequity of the distribution system. Although rationing had been introduced, it had not functioned effectively and the black market had flourished. In 1939 the German authorities were determined not to make the same mistake again and had, therefore, made plans for a more efficient and equitable rationing system, which was introduced on 28 August 1939.<sup>42</sup>

Whereas Britain limited its rationing mainly to protein foods, milk, and fats and so was able to adopt a uniform system of rationing, since the need for these varies little between individuals, German rationing covered a wider range of foods, including carbohydrates, and so was obliged to adopt a differential system, allocating larger amounts to certain categories which required a higher calorie intake.<sup>43</sup> The scheme initially involved three main categories based on performance: the normal consumer (64.5% of the population), who received 2,570 calories per day, the heavy worker (6%) 3,789 calories, and the very heavy worker (2.3%) 4,652 calories. In addition, there was the *Wehrmacht* (5.9%), children under six (9.6%) 1,871 calories, and children aged 6-14 (11.5%) 2450 calories. From 20 November 1939, a new category was introduced between the normal worker and the heavy workers for those who worked excessively long hours and night workers. The average daily calorie intake per individual per day from 25 September 1939 was 2,672. This compares with 3,206 in 1938 and with an average requirement for the

maintenance of full physical health of 2,700. Food rationing was paralleled by rationing of other commodities. Thus, the German population was expected to tighten its belt very considerably and, unlike the measures of the War Economy Decree of 4 September 1939, there was no let-up in the pressure after the victory over Poland, despite the widespread disgruntlement reported by the SD.

In fact, for much of the time workers did not actually receive the norms because of problems of supply and distribution of particular commodities. In the spring of 1942, there was a general crisis in the food supply which caused rations to be cut.<sup>44</sup> However, by the autumn they had been partially restored and it was only in the last months of the war that the food supply position became critical. The war did see an increase in sickness rates, but the deterioration in health was by no means catastrophic and Allied doctors who examined the health of the Germans in the aftermath of the war pronounced it suprisingly good.<sup>45</sup> This was very different from the First World War when the appalling flu epidemic of the winter of 1918-19 wreaked havoc among a debilitated population.

It is clear from the SD reports that morale was significantly affected by food supplies. Thus, after the announcement of the cut in rations in March 1942, the SD reported as follows:

Several reports state that the announcement of the 'deep cuts' in food supplies has had a really 'devastating' effect on a large section of the population to a degree which is virtually unparalleled by any other incident during the war. Although people are generally aware of the fact that, in order to achieve final victory, the German people will have to adjust to this new situation, relatively few people have been prepared to show the requisite understanding for the new cut in food rations. In particular, the workers in the big cities and industrial areas, who often considered the previous supplies pretty limited, are apparently adopting an attitude which shows no understanding whatsoever for the necessity of this new measure. The mood among these sections of the population has reached the lowest point ever in the course of the war. Numerous compatriots have expressed their disappointment in ironical remarks about the allegedly secure German supply situation and in frank hints about a deterioration in their future work performance. The new restrictions are felt particularly acutely by housewives who find it impossible to feed their families adequately ... In the context of the announcement of a cut in food rations the population is once more becoming increasingly preoccupied with the question of the fairness of the allocation of food and other goods in short supply. People – particularly workers – mention with great bitterness the fact that a large section of the so-called better-off circles can get hold of things in short supply in addition to their food rations through their social connections and their bigger purses. There is widespread concern that after the implementation of the new food allocations, bartering on the Black Market will become even more widespread than hitherto.<sup>46</sup>

In the autumn of 1942, the cuts made in March were partially revoked and a special Christmas bonus was announced as well as concessions to those on leave from the front. Also, Göring made a major speech boasting about the huge resources of food which Germany had conquered in its summer campaign. This produced a significant improvement in morale according to the SD report of 8 October 1942.<sup>47</sup>

Shortages of other commodities could also have quite an impact on morale, but significantly the effect seems to have been worst in the early days when the shortages were not so acute but when people were less inured to them. In the winter of 1939-1940, for example, considerable discontent was reported over shortages, in particular of shoes and coal.<sup>48</sup> The coal crisis was so serious that some firms had to shut down for days at a time and domestic heating was a major problem during what was a severe winter. However, these shortages became much worse later on. In the final months of the war the supply of food and other essential commodities such as gas and even water began to collapse in some areas and yet these shortages did not produce another November 1918.<sup>49</sup>

In a situation in which the supply of most commodities was regulated by rationing wages were clearly less significant as a factor in sustaining morale than in normal times. However, they remained important, particularly since not everything was rationed and the black market became increasingly significant as the war continued. Although the government failed in its plans to reduce wages at the outbreak of war, it did impose a wage freeze with the goal of avoiding inflation.<sup>50</sup> And, despite the fact that it was not wholly successful in sustaining the freeze, it did manage to achieve a remarkable degree of price and wage stability. The cost of living index rose by only 12 per cent between 1939 and 1944 although the money in circulation went up five times from 10.95 to 56.7 billion RM, whereas the Mark had lost half its value between 1914 and 1918. Wage increases were achieved mainly through an increase in hours worked rather than in hourly rates. Up to 1941, there was a slight increase in real earnings for industrial workers; after that date they appear to have declined slightly until, in 1943, they equalled those of 1938, though gross earnings were still higher than in 1939. However, data for real earnings, particularly in the later phases of the war are largely guess-work because of the difficulty of assessing what workers could actually buy with their wages. However, what is clear is that, whereas in the First World War high inflation and a sharp decline in real wages for many social groups contributed much to the deterioration in morale between 1916 and 1918, in the Second World War these did not occur.

Morale was also sustained – for a time at any rate – by the expectations aroused and the opportunities created by the war. In 1940, for example, the German Labour Front published proposals for a new pensions and health insurance scheme – a kind

of German Beveridge Plan, though one requiring its recipients to conform to the norms of the 'national community'.<sup>51</sup> Similarly, Robert Ley, the head of the Labour Front, was appointed to head a major housing project for the post-war era, which envisaged the creation of model housing estates.<sup>52</sup> These programmes were portrayed as a manifestation of the express wish of the Führer that 'victory should ensure a better life for every German'.<sup>53</sup>

While these programmes represented hopes for the future, the war also brought benefits, for some at least, in the present. Above all, it increased the possibilities of upward social mobility which had already emerged in the pre-war years – for example, through the rapid expansion of the officer corps in the armed forces and the numerous posts in the expanding bureaucracies required to run the New Order in Europe. Retraining programmes enabled workers to improve their qualifications and thereby increase their pay and acquire better jobs, while many of the remaining German workers who had not been conscripted into the armed forces became supervisors of foreign workers.<sup>54</sup>

The mood of the German people on the outbreak of war was summed up by two post-war historians, one of whom (Helmut Krausnick) had personally experienced it, as 'reluctant loyalty'.<sup>55</sup> The great foreign policy successes of the preceding years – the Rhineland, Munich, Prague etc. had been extremely popular. But the most popular thing about them had been that they had been achieved without war. Only a few fanatical Nazis and naive Hitler Youth members actually wanted a major war. This had represented a significant failure of Nazi indoctrination. However, although the German people entered the war reluctantly, their loyalty to the regime was not in question. For, by 1939, the Nazi regime had acquired a very large reservoir of support which it could draw on when the going got tough. The overcoming of the economic crisis of the early 1930s and the restoration of Germany's international prestige, and the fact that these achievements were associated with an individual who had come to embody not only the regime but, as far as many Germans were concerned, the nation itself – these facts provided a great reserve of strength.<sup>56</sup> By 1939, most people trusted the Führer to know and to do what was best for Germany even if it might not always seem so. It would take a considerable time and a series of major defeats before this confidence was seriously eroded.

In Germany, as in Britain, morale responded to the course of the war, though, as is clear from the British case, not necessarily through the obvious correlation of success with high morale and vice versa. In Germany, however, the high point of civilian morale was reached in the second half of June 1940. Referring to the activities of opposition forces in Germany, the SD reported on 24 June that:

Under the impression of the great political events and under the spell of military success, the whole German nation is displaying an inner unity and close bond between the front and the homeland which is unprecedented. The soil is no longer fertile for opposition groups. Everyone looks up to the Führer in trust and gratitude and to his armed forces pressing forward from victory to victory. Opposition activities meet everywhere with sharp rejection.<sup>57</sup>

However, just as, if not more, important than military victory in creating this mood was the belief that the war would soon come to an end. And, by 7 October, the SD was reporting a change of mood:

It is clear from the Gau reports of the past week that large sections of the population are adopting a completely unappreciative and thoroughly uncooperative attitude which expresses itself in particular in comments about the press and the radio. Impatience with the fact that the 'big blow' against England has not yet occurred predominates. People are already switching their attention to other topics. Even interest in military developments has declined most regrettably. Grudgingly and reluctantly, the population is getting used to the thought of a second winter of war and daily worries, particularly about fuel, have come to the surface.<sup>58</sup>

Although the initial successes of the Russian campaign in June-July 1941 produced a brief mood of confidence, it was soon replaced by growing concern, particularly when, in December 1941, Goebbels announced a public collection of warm winter clothing for the troops on the eastern front. Above all, the military crisis of winter 1941-1942 produced a crisis of credibility for German propaganda.

In some respects it could be said that British propaganda was fortunate in having a war which began with Britain on her beam ends and in which the Government had little choice but to spell out the problems the country faced in blunt terms ('blood, toil, tears, and sweat'). In the case of Germany the position was reversed. She started at the top and then had to cope with a series of ups and downs leading into a steady decline. Moreover, the Nazi regime and above all Hitler's role as Führer had been built on success. It was understandable, therefore, that the leadership tended towards over-optimism in its public comments and was loath to admit to difficulties. The problem was, however, that the growing gap between the reality, as people perceived it or suspected it, and the picture portrayed by Nazi propaganda undermined people's belief in the official media. For example, on 3 October 1941, Hitler announced in a major speech that 'this opponent' referring to the Soviet Union 'is already broken and will never recover'.<sup>59</sup> Six days later, this was confirmed by Otto Dietrich, the Reich Press Chief, who announced to the assembled press that the Soviet Union was 'militarily finished'.<sup>60</sup> In fact, of course, within two months the German armies were reeling back in headlong retreat and, with appeals

for warm clothing and generals being dismissed, it was impossible to disguise the crisis that had developed. It was not surprising, therefore, that, on 22 January 1942, the SD reported as follows:

It is clear from a number of reports that the impact of the public media of guidance is at the moment greatly impaired. Of the various explanations usually given the following are the most frequent:

People had the feeling that when things were going badly the public media of guidance always preserved an 'official face'. As a result, in such situations large sections of the population no longer regard the press as the best source of information but construct 'their own picture' from rumours, stories told by soldiers, and people with 'political connections', letters from the front and such like, often accepting the craziest rumours with an astonishing lack of discrimination.

Also as regards the reasons for and implications of the wool collection, the event which has affected the population in the civilian sector more than any other since the beginning of the war, the public media of guidance had preserved their 'official face' in the sense of not giving any answers to the questions about the alleged organizational deficiencies of winter planning and the late timing of the collection, questions that were being asked by everybody.<sup>61</sup>

Once the war started running into difficulties, Goebbels had wanted to adopt a more realistic tone in Nazi propaganda, but in its reports the Army leadership, fearing damage to morale, preferred to disguise reality with euphemism and in this they were supported by Hitler. On 6 January 1943, with the Stalingrad disaster already apparent, Goebbels reflected on the inadequacy of German propaganda hitherto. 'Since the beginning of the war', he told German newspaper editors, 'our propaganda has followed the following erroneous course: first year of the war: We have won. Second year of the war: We shall win. Third year of the war: We must win. Fourth year of the war: We cannot be defeated. Such a development is catastrophic and must on no account be continued.'<sup>62</sup>

Goebbels responded to the Stalingrad crisis with his notorious 'total war' speech of 18 February 1943, in which in a series of ten questions, to which the carefully selected audience shouted 'yes', he called for a commitment from the whole population to wage total war, a kind of Nazi version of Churchill's 'blood, toil, tears, and sweat' speech.<sup>63</sup> The speech was greeted by relief that at last the Government had 'come clean' about the real situation. However, in view of what had happened up till then, people were rightly sceptical about the extent to which the burdens of war would be shared and fearful of the allied response to such a call for 'total war'.<sup>64</sup> Ruhr mine-workers shouted at the British bombers going over:

Dear Tommy, Dear Tommy fly on to Berlin  
They're the ones who said yes to him.<sup>65</sup>

As the situation at the front continued to deteriorate, so the SD reported a growing sense of disillusionment with the regime. Thus, on 8 July, 1943, they reported:

The telling of vulgar jokes detrimental to the state, even about the Führer himself, has increased considerably since Stalingrad. In conversations in cafes, factories and other meeting places people tell each other the 'latest' political jokes and in many cases make no distinction between those with a harmless content and those which are clearly in opposition to the state. Even people who hardly know each other exchange jokes. They clearly assume that any joke can now be told without fear of a sharp rebuff, let alone of being reported to the police. Large sections of the population and even a section of the Party membership have clearly lost the feeling that listening to and passing on political jokes of a certain type is something which a decent German simply does not do...<sup>66</sup>

And yet, despite the increasing disillusionment with the regime, and despite the growing burdens of the war, the German people did not revolt and morale did not totally collapse. Why was this ?

Apart from the points already made about the relative improvement in material circumstances by comparison with the First World War, an important factor was clearly the machinery of terror which was both highly efficient and extremely ruthless and which experienced a tremendous expansion during the war.<sup>67</sup> The war was fought by Hitler from the start as an ideological war, not only abroad against the 'sub-human' Poles and Russians, but also at home in the form of a purging of the 'national body'. All those groups regarded as being 'outside the national community' because they failed to conform to its norms – Jews, Gypsies, the mentally ill and handicapped, habitual criminals and 'asocials', and political offenders were removed from it through incarceration in prison or concentration camp or permanently through extermination.

As far as the question of morale was concerned, the system of terror operated in three main spheres: 1) against breaches of work discipline; 2) against organized opposition; 3) against those deemed guilty of undermining national morale without necessarily being involved in organized opposition.

As far as the category of work discipline was concerned, early on in the war the Gestapo established so-called 'Work Re-education Camps' where persistent absentees and 'slackers' (*Bummelanten*) were sent for periods of 6-8 weeks with the intention of administering a short sharp shock.<sup>68</sup> One gauge of German workers' morale is the fact that the number of German workers arrested each month for disciplinary offences rose by 52% between 1941 and the first half of 1944. In the

latter period 20,000 German workers were being arrested each month for labour discipline offences. SD reports referred to the resentment of workers at the unequal distribution of the burdens of the war. However, the re-education camps were increasingly used for foreign workers, whereas Germans tended to be fined or in serious cases sent to prison. In fact, the regime was cautious about cracking down too hard over breaches of work discipline and also could not afford the loss of labour involved in sending people off to prison. In any case, the discipline of male German workers was generally good. An important reason for this was their fear of losing their status as reserved workers and being sent to the front. The majority of disciplinary offences were committed by women and young people under eighteen against whom the authorities felt unable to act toughly for fear of affecting morale. The relationship between the working class and the regime during the war has been summed up as 'the containment of working-class discontent rather than any enthusiasm for the regime and its policies'.<sup>69</sup>

As far as the second category – organized opposition – is concerned, the main sources of opposition were the Communists, at any rate after the attack on Russia, and the Resistance movement which culminated in the July 1944 plot against Hitler. They lie beyond the scope of this paper, although from the point of view of morale it must be said that neither had a significant basis of popular support.

Finally, at the outbreak of war, the Nazis introduced a number of measures based on the concept of 'defeatism' (*Wehrkraftzersetzung*). For example, at the beginning of the war, a ban on listening to foreign broadcasts was introduced with those found guilty being sentenced to imprisonment and, in serious cases, where they passed on information which was then construed as 'defeatist', to death. In fact, as the war went on, people making defeatist comments – perhaps overheard by their maid, for example, – were increasingly likely to be sentenced to death. In addition, a number of other offences, such as theft, which were construed as taking advantage of the war situation, e.g. the blackout, received the death penalty. The numbers of executions rose rapidly during the war from 143 in 1939 to 1,146 in 1941 and 5,764 in 1944.<sup>70</sup>

There were thus powerful reasons for people not to draw attention to themselves. As one worker put it: 'Rather than let them string me up I'll be glad to believe in victory.'<sup>71</sup> Added to this was the fact that the regime's virtual monopoly of organization combined with its control of the media ensured that the German people were atomised and deprived of access to alternative sources of information apart from their immediate contacts among family, work colleagues, and friends.<sup>72</sup> They were thus seriously hampered in developing an effective critique, let alone mobilizing a challenge to the regime of the kind that developed between 1916 and 1918.

This process of atomization was aided by the progressive dilution of the work force through waves of conscription of German workers from plants and their replacement by foreign workers, women, or very young workers. Women and young workers were notoriously indisciplined, but it was the indiscipline of individuals and posed no organized threat to the regime.

Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to attribute the lack of a November 1918 solely to the effects of terror, or to portray the Germans as a cowed population. It is significant, for example, that the response of the German public to the July 1944 plot against Hitler was not one of approval and disappointment at its failure, but rather of disapproval and relief.<sup>73</sup> There was a widespread feeling that these officers and top officials had rocked the national boat at a time when it was going through very choppy waters. By that time (July 1944), most people had come to feel that whether they liked it or not – and, as we have seen, many had by then become disillusioned with the regime and even with the Führer – they were bound together to the bitter end.

This sense of national solidarity was generated not so much by a residual patriotism, though this may have existed, but more by fear of the future, in particular of the Red Army, a fear reinforced by a sense of guilt for the conduct of the war in the East and the treatment of the Jews.<sup>74</sup> There was, in fact, a more general sense of complicity with the regime, which, together with a deep physical and emotional exhaustion after five years of war, helped to produce a paralysing belief that there was no alternative, an impression reinforced but not created by the Allied doctrine of 'unconditional surrender'. This situation was vigorously exploited by Nazi propaganda in its attempt to persuade the German people that they were indeed bound to the regime in a *Schicksalsgemeinschaft*, a 'community of fate'. There was thus a widespread feeling that there was no real alternative to staying on board and going over the waterfall together. Moreover, underpinning this relatively high degree of national solidarity was the local solidarity at the work place and in local communities. However, this raises the question of how and to what extent this local solidarity could be sustained under the impact of the Allied bombing campaign.

The bombing campaign had a tremendous physical impact in terms of death and destruction and it grew enormously from year to year. The total bomb load in 1943 was four times that of 1942 and in 1944 five times that of 1943. In February 1942 there were an average of 220 deaths per month from bombing, in the summer of 1942 this went up to 750, in 1943 up to 7,000, and in 1944 there were 5,500 – a drop which may be attributed to a shift in emphasis towards the second front in the West.<sup>75</sup> In four raids on Hamburg carried out within one week between 24 and 31 July 1943 45,000 were killed (40,000 in the firestorm on the night of 27-28th alone).

This compares with the total of 51,509 civilians killed in the United Kingdom by German bombing during the whole of the Second World War.<sup>76</sup> In the main part of the city of Hamburg 56 per cent of the family dwelling units were destroyed during this week and 900,000 people lost their homes. Over one million people fled the city during and in the aftermath of the raid. I mention this week of Hamburg raids rather than the even more destructive Dresden one because it happened much earlier (Dresden was destroyed in February 1945) and is less well-known. What happened to Hamburg in a week was happening to other German cities more gradually but hardly less effectively. In 1944, the city of Cologne, for example, had an air raid warning once a day and an air raid twice a week throughout that year.

The aim of these raids was to demoralize the German people. However, like the much less extensive raids on Britain, they failed. Workers continued to return to work after the raids. Even foreign workers cooperated voluntarily in the fire-fighting and clearing-up afterwards. Only a few took the opportunity to flee. Why was this?<sup>77</sup>

One fact was undoubtedly fear – above all, fear of losing their status as reserved workers and being sent to the eastern front. This need not even be an individual punishment. For, if the plant was unable to keep producing after a raid all the workers would inevitably be liable to conscription. However, there were also material benefits to be gained from continuing work. In order to secure their supplementary rations as heavy or very heavy workers they had to sign on in their plant. Also they could only get replacements for ration cards lost in air raids and compensation for war damage to their homes if they returned to their plants for a signature from their employers. In fact, some firms provided useful help in dealing with the authorities by bulk buying various scarce commodities such as bedding. Employers were anxious to keep their workers, in order not to be closed down.

Last, but by no means least, there were the psychological benefits from carrying on as before. The ordered routine of work provided a point of stability in a world of increasing chaos and a distraction from having to think about the future. A miner commented: 'I look forward to the evening with horror. As long as I am at work I don't remember, but when I get home I'm afraid.'<sup>78</sup>

Thus, while the extreme situation created by mass bombing certainly helped to undermine confidence in the regime as it had been intended to by the Allied strategists of area bombing, at the same time it created an atmosphere in which people became dominated by the priority of the need to survive from day to day. A new form of greeting emerged: 'BU' short for 'Bleib übrig' 'stay alive', literally 'be a survivor'.

This priority of survival through a catastrophe, and increasingly one whose end could be foreseen in the not too distant future, reinforced the tendency for people to keep their heads down for fear of the Gestapo and through sheer exhaustion. As the wielder of power, the Nazi regime benefitted from this. Those people who attempted to opt out of the 'community of fate' by desertion or premature surrender were summarily dealt with by the remaining hard-line supporters of the regime. In January 1945, Himmler imposed the death penalty for any leader of a civil office who abandoned his post without orders. The final weeks saw thousands of hangings and shootings.<sup>79</sup> For the Nazis were determined to prevent another November 1918 and to ensure that their fellow-Germans went over the waterfall with them.

### NOTES

1. Cf. T.W. Mason, 'The Legacy of 1918 for National Socialism' in A. Nicholls and E. Matthias (ed.), *German Democracy and the Triumph of Hitler* (London, 1971) and *Sozialpolitik im Dritten Reich. Arbeiterklasse und Volksgemeinschaft*. (Opladen, 1977), pp. 15-41.
2. Cf. Mark Harrison, 'Resource Mobilization for World War II: the U.S.A., U.K., U.S.S.R. and Germany, 1938-1945', *Economic History Review* 2nd. 41 (1988), pp.171-92.
3. For the latest phase of the debate see B.R. Kroener, 'Squaring the Circle. Blitzkrieg Strategy and Manpower Shortage 1939-1942' in W. Deist (ed.), *The German Military in the Age of Total War* (Leamington, 1985), pp. 282-303; R.D. Müller, 'Die Mobilisierung der deutschen Wirtschaft für Hitlers Kriegführung' in B.Kroener et. al, *Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg* Vol. 5/1. *Organisation und Mobilisierung des deutschen Machtbereichs. Kriegsverwaltung, Wirtschaft und personellen Ressourcen 1939-1941* (Stuttgart, 1988), pp. 349-689; B.R. Kroener, 'Die personellen Ressourcen des Dritten Reiches im Spannungsfeld zwischen Wehrmacht, Bürokratie und Kriegswirtschaft 1939-1942' in *ibid.*, pp. 693-1002; R.Overy, '“Blitzkriegswirtschaft”? Finanzpolitik, Lebensstandard und Arbeitseinsatz in Deutschland 1939-1942' *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 36 (1988), pp. 379-435; R.Overy, 'Mobilization for Total War in Germany 1939-1941' *English Historical Review* 103 (1988), pp. 613-39; B.R.Kroener, 'Der Kampf um den "Sparstoff Mensch". Forschungskontroversen über die Mobilisierung der deutschen Kriegswirtschaft 1939-1942' in W. Michalka (ed.), *Der Zweite Weltkrieg* (Munich, 1989), pp. 402-17
4. Cf. *Documents on German Foreign Policy* Series D, Vol. VI. p. 225.

5. Cf. W. Deist, *The Wehrmacht and German Rearmament* (London, 1981), pp. 91ff.
6. Cf. H-E. Volkmann, 'Die NS-Wirtschaft in Vorbereitung des Krieges' in W. Deist et al., *Das Deutsche Reich und Der Zweite Weltkrieg Vol.1. Ursachen und Voraussetzungen der Deutschen Kriegspolitik* (Stuttgart, 1979), pp. 364ff.
7. Cf. T. Mason, 'Labour in the Third Reich 1933-1939', in *Past and Present* 33 (1966), p. 20; M-L. Recker, *Nationalsozialistische Sozialpolitik im Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Munich, 1985), pp. 26ff; L. Herbst, *Der Totale Krieg und die Ordnung der Wirtschaft. Die Kriegswirtschaft im Spannungsfeld von Politik, Ideologie und Propaganda 1939-1945* (Stuttgart 1982), pp. 103-26.
8. Cf. S. Salter, 'The Mobilisation of German Labour, 1939-1945. A Contribution to the History of the Working Class in the Third Reich' (D.Phil. thesis, Oxford University, 1983), pp. 15-16.
9. See the references in fn.7.
10. Cf. A.S. Milward, 'Arbeitspolitik und Produktivität in der deutschen Kriegswirtschaft unter vergleichendem Aspekt' in F. Forstmeier and H-E. Volkmann, (ed.), *Kriegswirtschaft und Rüstung 1939-1945* (Düsseldorf, 1977), pp. 88-9.
11. Cf. Salter, (above, note 8), pp. 12ff; Kroener, 'Die personellen Ressourcen..', (above, note 3), pp. 757ff.; W.F. Werner, "Bleib übrig". *Deutsche Arbeiter in der nationalsozialistischen Kriegswirtschaft* (Düsseldorf, 1983), pp. 81ff.
12. Cf. Salter, (above, note 8), p. 6.
13. On foreign labour see E.L. Homze, *Foreign Labour in Nazi Germany* (Princeton, 1967), and, above all, U. Herbert, *Fremdarbeiter. Politik und Praxis des "Ausländer-Einsatzes" in der Kriegswirtschaft des Dritten Reiches* (Berlin-Bonn, 1986).
14. Cf. Herbert, (above, note 13), pp. 205ff.
15. Cf. H. Boberach (ed.), *Meldungen aus dem Reich. Die geheimen Lageberichte des Sicherheitsdienstes der SS 1938-1945* Vol. 11 (Herrsching, 1984) pp. 4084-5.
16. E.g. by Albert Speer in his memoirs, *Inside the Third Reich* (London, 1970), pp. 220-1.
17. Overy, "Blitzkriegswirtschaft?" (above, note 3), pp. 425ff.
18. Cf. W. Bleyer, *Staat und Monopole im totalen Krieg* (East Berlin, 1970), p. 125.
19. Cf. D. Winkler, *Frauenarbeit im "Dritten Reich"* (Hamburg, 1977), p. 150.
20. Ibid., p. 181.
21. For the following see, *ibid.*, pp. 85ff and 176ff, and L. Eiber, 'Frauen in der Kriegsindustrie. Arbeitsbedingungen, Lebensumstände und Protestverhalten' in M. Broszat et al., *Bayern in der NS-Zeit. Vol III. Herrschaft und Gesellschaft im Konflikt* (Munich, 1981), pp. 574ff.

22. Cf. G. Lilienthal, *Der "Lebensborn e.V." Ein Instrument nationalsozialistischer Rassenpolitik* (Stuttgart-New York, 1985), pp. 132ff.
23. Cf. Winkler, (above, note 19), p. 109.
24. Ibid., pp. 134ff.
25. Cf. Salter, (above, note 8), pp. 37-8, 52ff.; T.W. Mason, 'Women in Germany 1925-40: Family, Welfare and Work', *History Workshop Journal* 2 (Spring 1977), pp. 18ff; Winkler, (above, note 19), pp. 105, 110ff.
26. For the following see Winkler, (above, note 19), pp. 114ff.
27. Overy, "Blitzkriegswirtschaft?" (above, note 3), p. 428.
28. Winkler, (above, note 19), p. 143.
29. Ibid.
30. Cf. Boberach (ed.), (above, note 15), vol.7, p. 2639.
31. Cf. Winkler, (above, note 19), p. 99.
32. Boberach (ed.), (above, note 15), vol.11, p. 4100.
33. Ibid., p. 4102.
34. Winkler, (above, note 19), pp.124-5; J. McIntyre, 'Women and the Professions in Germany 1930-1940' in A.J. Nicholls & E. Matthias (eds.), *German Democracy and the Triumph of Hitler* (London, 1971), pp. 212ff.
35. Winkler, (above, note 19), pp. 126ff.
36. For the following see *ibid.*, pp. 164ff.
37. Ibid., pp. 172-3.
38. For the following see *ibid.*, pp. 154ff.
39. Cf. L.J. Rupp, *Mobilizing Woman for War. German and American Propaganda 1939-1945* (Princeton, 1978), p. 171.
40. Cf. H-E. Volkmann, 'Landwirtschaft und Ernährung in Hitlers Europa 1939-1945' *Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen*, 35 (1986), pp. 9-74 and A. Milward, *War, Economy and Society 1939-1945* (London, 1976), pp. 259-71.
41. Cf. L. Burchardt, 'The Impact of the War Economy on the Civilian Population of Germany during the First and Second World Wars' in Deist (ed.), (above, note 3), pp. 40-70.
42. On the lessons learnt from the First World War see M. Kutz, 'Die agrarwirtschaftliche Vorbereitung des Zweiten Weltkrieges in Deutschland vor dem Hintergrund des Weltkrieg 1-Erfahrung' *Zeitschrift für Agrargeschichte und Agrarsoziologie* 32. H.1, pp. 59-82.
43. Cf. Werner, (above, note 11), pp. 44ff. On the comparison with Britain see K.G. Fenelon, *Britain's Food Supplies* (London, 1952), pp. 77-8.
44. Cf. Werner, (above, note 11), pp. 194ff.
45. Ibid., pp. 160ff, 300ff.

46. Cf. H. Boberach (ed.), (above, note 15), vol. 9. pp. 3504-5.
47. Ibid. vol. 11, pp. 4291-2.
48. See, for example, the SD reports of 8 and 27 December 1939 and 8 January 1940 in *ibid.*, vol. 3, pp. 552-3, 608, 622-3.
49. Cf. Werner, (above, note 11), pp. 329ff.
50. On the development of wages policy see *ibid.*, pp. 34ff, 105ff, 220ff; Salter (above, note 8), pp. 116-156; Recker, (above, note 7), pp. 26-57, 82-97, 193-249. On prices and wages see also D. Petzina, 'Soziale Lage der deutschen Arbeiter und Probleme des Arbeitseinsatzes während des Zweiten Weltkrieges' in W. Dlugoborski (ed.), *Zweiter Weltkrieg und sozialer Wandel. Achsenmächte und besetzte Gebiete* (Göttingen, 1981), pp. 73-79.
51. Cf. Recker, (above, note 7), pp. 98-127.
52. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 128-54.
53. Quoted in N. Frei, 'Der totale Krieg und die Deutschen' in *idem* (ed.), *Der nationalsozialistische Krieg* (Frankfurt/New York, 1990), p. 291.
54. Ibid, p. 292 and M. Roseman, 'World War II and Social Change in Germany' in A. Marwick (ed.), *Total War and Social Change* (London, 1988), pp. 58-78. On the expansion and social transformation of the officer corps see B.R. Kroener, 'Auf dem Weg zu einer nationalsozialistischen Volksarmee' in M. Broszat, *et.al.* (eds.), *Von Stalingrad zur Währungsreform. Zur Sozialgeschichte des Umbruchs in Deutschland* (Munich, 1988), pp. 651-82. On workers see L. Niethammer, 'Heimat und Front. Versuch, zehn Kriegserinnerungen aus der Arbeiterklasse des Ruhrgebietes zu verstehen' in *idem*, (ed.), *"Die Jahre weiss man nicht, wo man sie heute hinsetzen soll"*. *Faschismuserfahrungen im Ruhrgebiet* (Berlin-Bonn, 1983), pp. 97-132;
55. By Helmut Krausnick and Hermann Graml in H. Krausnick and H. Graml, 'Der deutsche Widerstand und die Alliierten' *Vollmacht des Gewissens 2* (Frankfurt, 1965), p. 482. See also W. Deist, 'Überlegungen zur "widerwilligen Loyalität" der Deutschen bei Kriegsbeginn' in Michalka, (above, note 3), pp. 224-39.
56. Cf. I. Kershaw, *The Hitler Myth. Image and Reality in the Third Reich* (Oxford, 1987), pp. 143ff.
57. Cf. Boberach (ed.), (above, note 15), vol. 4, p. 1305.
58. Ibid., vol. 5, pp. 1645-6.
59. M. Domarus (ed.), *Hitler, Reden und Proklamationen 1932-1945* (Wiesbaden, 1973), vol. 2, p. 63.
60. Cf. W.A. Boelcke, *Wollt Ihr den totalen Krieg. Die geheimen Goebbels Konferenzen 1939-1943* (Stuttgart, 1969), p. 245.

61. Cf. Boberach (ed.), (above, note 15), vol. 9, p. 3195.
62. Ibid., pp. 417-18.
63. Cf. H. Heiber (ed.), *Goebbels-Reden* (Düsseldorf, 1972), vol. 2, pp. 172ff; G. Moltmann, 'Goebbels' Rede zum Totalen Krieg am 18 Januar 1943', *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 12 (1964), pp. 12-43.
64. For a discussion of the response to Goebbels' speech see G. Moltmann (above, note 15), and M. Steinert, *Hitlers Krieg und die Deutschen. Stimmung und Haltung der deutschen Bevölkerung im Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Düsseldorf-Vienna, 1970), pp. 334ff.
65. Steinert, (above, note 64), p. 362.
66. H. Boberach (ed.), (above, note 15), vol. 14. pp. 5445-6.
67. On Nazi terror see H. Buchheim *et.al.*, *Anatomy of the SS-State* (London, 1968) and the relevant sections in *Deutschland im Zweiten Weltkrieg* 6 vols (East Berlin, 1975-1985).
68. On the relationship between the working class and the regime and specifically work discipline see Salter (above, note 15), pp. 172-242, 285-94 and 'Structures of Consensus and Coercion: Workers' Morale and the Maintenance of Work Discipline 1939-1945' in D. Welch (ed.), *Nazi Propaganda* (London, 1983), pp. 88-116; W.F. Werner (above, note 11), pp. 26ff, 72ff, 171f, 318ff. On female work discipline see *ibid.*, pp. 92ff. On young people see D. Peukert, *Inside Nazi Germany. Conformity, Opposition and Racism in Everyday Life* (London, 1987), pp. 145-74.
69. Cf. S. Salter, 'Germany' in S. Salter and J. Stevenson (ed.), *The Working Class and Politics in Europe and America 1929-1945* (London, 1990), pp. 99-124.
70. See the figures in W. Ruge and W. Schumann (ed.), *Dokumente zur deutschen Geschichte 1943-1945* (Frankfurt, 1968), p. 143.
71. Cf. Werner, (above, note 11), p. 341.
72. Cf. Salter, (above, note 69), p. 118.
73. Cf. Frei, (above, note 53), pp. 296-7.
74. See, for example, the report of the Stuttgart office of the SD dated 6 November 1944 in J. Noakes and G. Pridham (ed.), *Documents on Nazism 1919-1945* (London, 1974), p. 669.
75. Cf. Werner, (above, note 11), p. 257.
76. Cf. M. Middlebrook, *The Battle of Hamburg. The Firestorm Raid* (London, 1980), p. 328.
77. For the following see, in particular, Werner, (above, note 11), pp. 259ff, 350ff.
78. Ibid., p. 266.
79. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 354; Frei, (above, note 53), p. 298, and J. Stevenson, 'Resistance' to 'No Surrender': Popular Disobedience in Württemberg in 1945' in F.R. Nicosia and L.D. Stokes (ed.), *Germans Against Nazism. Essays in Honour of Peter Hoffman* (Berg, 1990), pp. 351-67.

**THE CIVILIAN IN WAR**  
The Home Front in Europe, Japan and the USA  
in World War II

*Edited by*  
**JEREMY NOAKES**

Exeter Studies in History No. 32  
University of Exeter Press