



RULING CLASS STRUCTURES OF THE KAZAN KHANATE

DR. DONALD OSTROWSKI
HARVARD UNIVERSITY / U.S.A.

Could the Khanate of Kazan' (ca. 1438-1552) have lasted longer than it did? Did the Kazan' ruling class fail to optimize its strategies for long-term independence? To provide answers to these questions, we need to look at the institutional structures of the Kazan' Khanate, as well as its decision-making processes, and try to determine at least to some extent what the strategies of the Kazan' ruling class were. The contention of this paper is that the Kazan' ruling class made the best of a difficult and vulnerable geopolitical position and that there was little more they could have done to stave off final takeover.

The primary sources for the ruling structures of the Khanate of Kazan' include a number of *yarliks* (three are extant in Tatar, a few others in Russian translation),¹ Russian chronicle entries,² and diplomatic correspondence maintained in the Muscovite *Posol'skii prikaz* (Ambassadorial chancellery).³ In addition, Sigismund von Herberstein, ambassador of the Holy Roman Emperor, provides a contemporary account of Muscovite-Kazan' relations.⁴ These sources offer little direct information about the Kazan' Khanate's governmental and administrative institutions and social structure. For our attempt to understand those institutions and structures, the sources confront the historian with various difficulties dependent on their type. The *yarliks*, for our purposes, suffer from excessive specificity and an assumption of knowledge about the circumstances being described that we simply do not have. The Russian chronicle entries exhibit a strong bias in favor of the doings of the Muscovite court and ruler that all but precludes any attempt to understand what is going on from a Kazani perspective. Herberstein's account is derived

from Muscovite sources. And the Muscovite diplomatic documents are often couched in such ambiguous language (with some exceptions noted further on in this article) that they allow several equally plausible interpretations, and, in addition, discuss circumstances of mainly external, not internal, matters. A further problem with the Muscovite diplomatic sources is the loss of the archive of documents that dealt specifically with Kazan'.

Nonetheless, we have almost the entire run of *Posol'skii prikaz* documents dealing with the Crimean Khanate and the Nogai Horde, both of which provide valuable information about the Khanate of Kazan'.⁵ What is more, the Muscovite chronicles, from ca. 1530 on, often provide what seem to be verbatim copies from the "Kazan' books" of the *Posol'skii* archive.⁶ A careful reading of these copies allows us to reconstruct, to a certain extent, many of the documents dealing with Muscovite-Kazan' relations that have been lost.

In addition, by comparing the evidence from this rather sparse source base with evidence we have of other Tatar khanates in the western steppe area, we can tentatively tease out the vague contours of the ruling class structures of the Kazan' Khanate.⁷ The institutional structure of the typical Tatar khanate included a government headed by a khan traditionally a Chingisid-a descendent of Chingis Khan.

The khan regularly consulted with a divan of *qaraçi beys*, each of whom headed one of the major chiefdoms, of which there were usually four.⁸ This divan acted as a council of state and its approval was required for all significant state enterprises. The signatures of the *qaraçi beys* were required on all important documents concerning matters of internal policy.



Scene from Kazan (1630) (A. Olearyi)



Agreements with foreign powers necessitated witnessing by the *qaraçı beys* and often by additional important individuals as well, including brothers and sons of the khan, religious leaders, close advisers, as well as, at times, prestigious clan members other than the *qaraçı beys* themselves. Finally, all meetings with foreign ambassadors required the presence of the *qaraçı beys*, as representatives of the major clans. The khan was thereby precluded from making deals with foreign powers that might be inimical to the interests of the *qaraçı beys*. On occasion, the khan and divan received the advice of a representative assembly, the *quriltai*. The *quriltai* consisted of the notable men of the ruling class of the khanate, including relatives of the khan (*kalga, saltans*), religious leaders (*seyids, mollas, imams*), the retinue of the khan (*beys, ulany*), and various notables (*mirzas*) from the lower ranks of the ruling class. The *quriltai* not only advised the khan but also could depose a reigning khan as well as choose the next khan after the death or deposition of the previous khan. How closely does our evidence for the Khanate of Kazan' correlate with this standard model?


The khans of Kazan' were all Chingisids, but a number of considerations, legal, political, and customary, had to be considered by the Kazan' ruling class in choosing which of the eligible candidates would be selected.⁹ The first Khan of Kazan' was Ulu Muhammed, erstwhile Khan of the Khanate of Qipchaq (1419-1435).¹⁰ Ulu Muhammed was descended from Toğay-Timur, the brother of Batu. Thus, he was of Chingisid descent through Chingis Khan's son Joči. Ulu Muhammed's distant cousin, Küçük Muhammed, declared himself Khan of the Qipchaq Khanate in 1435 and took over rule of the Khanate. As a result, Ulu Muhammed fled northward with his followers to Belev, where he defeated a Muscovite military contingent sent to evict it on December 5, 1437.¹¹ In July 1439, Ulu Muhammed laid siege to Moscow for ten days, devastated the surrounding area, and burned the town of Kolomna.¹² These events, occurring as they did, immediately after Ulu Muhammed's flight from Sarai, provide some indication of the military power that he was beginning to gather around him, for the chronicles report that, at the time he fled from Sarai, he had only his personal retinue with him. Nonetheless, throughout its century-plus history, the Kazan' Khanate does not seem to have ever become militarily self-sufficient and, to a great extent, had to depend on foreign alliances for defense. By 1445, Ulu Muhammed had taken up permanent residence in Kazan', thus officially establishing the beginning of the Khanate of Kazan', after having ousted Āli Bek (1429-1445), the last ruler of the principality of Kazan'.¹³

The last notable success of Ulu Muhammed's reign was the capture of the Muscovite grand prince, Vasilii

II, near Suzdal' on July 7, 1445.¹⁴ In October of the same year, Ulu Muhammed released him for a large ransom, which no doubt proved useful for establishing his nascent khanate on a firmer financial basis.¹⁵

After the death of Ulu Muhammed the following year, his son Mahmud came to the throne. According to the *Kazan' History (Kazanskaia istoriia)*, Mahmud had his father and Yakup, his brother, murdered by having their legs amputated, so he could claim the throne.¹⁶ No credence can be given to this story for not only does it have Mahmud violating the Mongol-Tatar prohibition against the shedding of princely blood but also it overlooks the important point that Yakup, still very much alive (and apparently with both legs intact), goes over to fight in the service of the Muscovite grand prince in 1447.¹⁷

A crisis of sorts occurred in 1518 when Ulu Muhammed's great grandson, Khan Muhammed Emin (1484-1485, 1487-1495, 1502-1518), died because it represented the end of rule in Kazan' of the line of Ulu Muhammed.



Kazan (19. century)

Until then, khans could be chosen from among any male in the ruling family—specifically those descended from Mahmud, Ulu Muhammed's son. The two other sons of Ulu Muhammed, Kasim and Yakup, were no longer living. Kasim's son, Daniar, who became a prominent military commander for Muscovy, was also

deceased. Halil, the son of Mahmud, who had reigned as khan 1466-1467, left no male heirs. The next khan, İbrahim (1467-1479) had three sons by his first wife, Fatima: İlham (who reigned 1479-1485 and 1486-1487), Melik-Tagir, and Kudai Kul. İlham had no male heirs. Both Melik-Tagir and Kudai Kul went over into Muscovite service. Melik-Tagir had two sons, Fedor and Vasilii, both of whom were raised as Christians. Although there was no stipulation that the Khan of Kazan' had to be Muslim (indeed at least one thirteenth-century Khan of the Qipchaq Khanate may have been Christian), by the early sixteenth century, the tradition of having Muslim khans had been well established. That tradition was not broken until 1552, when Kazan' was conquered, and a Christian tsar/khan, Ivan IV, ruled (although Kazan' was no longer an independent polity at that point). İlham's third son, Kudai Kul, converted to Christianity taking the name Peter in 1505 and married Evdokhiia, the sister of Grand Prince Vasilii III. Evdokhiia and Kudai Kul/Peter had two daughters and no sons.¹⁸ İbrahim had two sons by his second wife, Nur Sultan. But neither Muhammed Emin nor _bdül-lâif, had male heirs.

Given this predicament, the Kazan' ruling class made what they probably hoped was the best choice they could. They selected Şah Āli, who was a relative of the Khan




of Astrakhan' Abdul Kerim (and thus a Chingisid) and who was in Muscovy under the protection of Vasilii III.¹⁹ Therefore, a potential alliance between Muscovy, Kazan', and Astrakhan' was set up. As one might imagine, such a prospect did not sit well with Muhammed Girey, the Crimean Khan, for he had warned Vasilii III before the death of Muhammed Emin in 1518: "And we have decided that if anything happens to Muhammed Emin we will make Sahip Girey Khan of that *yurt*. And if it should happen that someone coming from another *yurt* establishes himself as khan, you, my brother grand prince, will be in trouble (*v istome budesh'*) and things will not go well between us."²⁰ Muhammed Girey was not sympathetic to the Nomogan dynasty of Astrakhan' probably because, from his perspective, they had usurped the Crimean Khanate's right to rule Astrakhan'.²¹ But he was not in a position at that point to do anything about Vasilii's support of Şah Āli, because he would also be battling the Kazan' ruling class who had chosen him. But in 1521, the Kazan' ruling class turned against Şah Āli and deposed him. Then in a choice that had broad ramifications for western steppe diplomatic relations, the divan and *quriltai* chose Sahip Girey, the brother of Muhammed Girey, to be khan. In one stroke, the alliance of Kazan' with Muscovy and Astrakhan' went to an alliance of Kazan' with the Crimean Khanate.

Keenan sees Sahip Girey's accession to the throne as solely an attempt on the part of the local Kazan' princes "to retain their independence from their larger neighbors," and he argues against the idea that Muhammed Girey had anything to do with it.²² This view would seem to be contradicted by Muhammed Girey's message to the Khan of Astrakhan' that, at that time, the Kazan' princes "sent a man to me asking for a sultan, and I have sent them a sultan."²³ Yet, Muhammed Girey may have misrepresented what had occurred to neutralize the Astrakhan' Khan's support of Muscovy. Or Muhammed Girey may have had reason to believe he had selected the next khan. The Kazan' divan had a practice, when deliberating on the choice of a new khan, of sending an ambassador to the foreign ruler with whom they may have hoped their choice would cement an alliance, to see if that ruler was in agreement. This practice, in turn, led the Muscovite grand prince as well as the Crimean Khan at different times to think (or at least to claim) that they were in fact the one who had chosen the khan for the Kazan'.

If the Kazan' *qaraçı beys* were indeed trying to adopt an independent policy vis-à-vis the Muscovite grand prince, they may have miscalculated the effect that choosing the Crimean Khan's brother would have. For Muhammed Girey then claimed Kazan' was his *yurt*,²⁴ and he used it as a staging post for an attack on Moscow later that year. For almost all of the next 30 years, until

1551, a relative of the Crimean Khan ruled in Kazan'.²⁵ The initial military weakness of the Khanate of Kazan' when Ulu Muhammed established it in the late 1430s and early 1440s goes a long way to explain the evidence in the sources of diplomatic negotiations with neighboring states by the divan and *quriltai* over the choice of a khan. If we had the diplomatic correspondence of Kazan' with the Siberian and Astrakhan' Khans as well as with the Nogais, presumably we would find a similarly active consultation on this matter as with the Muscovite grand prince and the Crimean Khan.

Our evidence does not provide us much specific information about who was on the divan of *qaraçı beys* in Kazan'. One problem is that rarely do the terms "*qaraçı*" or "*bey*" (or "*beg*") appear in our sources for the Kazan' Khanate. Nor do we have much evidence concerning who the members of the divan, or state council, may have been.²⁶



Minaret of Burnaev Mosque, Kazan (1872)

One of the few times the Muscovite chronicles mention any names is under the entry for 1496 where they tell us the "princes" (*kniazii*) of Kazan', Kal Ahmed (Kalimet), Orak (Urak), Sadır (Sadyr), and Agiş (Agish) sent an envoy to Ivan III. No names of the clans or chiefdoms they headed are provided, but one possibility to be considered is that the chiefdoms of the Kazan' Khanate were made up of dissident elements from the Qipchaq Khanate that paralleled that khanate's major chiefdoms to a certain extent. And we can be fairly certain that the "princes" mentioned here in the Muscovite chronicles refer to the *qaraçı beys*, and not service princes, for two reasons. First, there are four of them, which matches the traditional number that

make up the divan of *qaraçı beys* in other Tatar khanates. Second, these princes are set apart much in the same way the *qaraçı beys* are referred to in the diplomatic correspondence to contrast them with *beys*, who are members of the khan's military retinue.²⁷

We do have evidence for the Şirin Prince Bulat designated a *qaraçı* by the Voskresensk and Nikon chronicles in 1519.²⁸ In the chronicle entries for 1551 and 1552, we find references to Bulat's son Nur Āli, who may have been the *ulu qaraçı*, or head of the divan. Under March 1551, he is referred to along "with the *ulany* and three or four princes."²⁹ In October of the same year, the Nikon Chronicle and *Tsarstvennaia kniga* mention "the head Kazani *qaraçı* Şirin Prince Nur Āli, son of Bulat, and the Şabas Prince Şamov...."³⁰ If "Şabas" refers here to a clan in the same sense as "Şirin" (the placement of these names in the text is the same), then this may provide evidence that "Şabas" was the name of one of the other Kazan' chiefdoms.

In 1923, Khudiakov made a breakthrough in the study of the sources for the institutional history of the




Kazan' Khanate. He pointed out fourteen instances of the Rus' chroniclers' using the term "all the land" (*vsia zemlia*) "all the Kazan' land" [*vsia Kazanskaia zemlia*] or "all the people of the Kazan' land" [*vse liudi Kazanskoi zemli*] between 1497 and 1551. Khudiakov identified these references with the *quriltai* of Kazan'.³¹ Although a *quriltai* did not consist of "all the people," the notion that it represented all the land found subsequent echo in the Muscovites' use of "land" (*zemlia*) to refer to their representative assembly (later referred to in the historiography as the *Zemskii sobor*).³² By analyzing the cases where the terms "all the Kazan' land" and "all the people of the Kazan' land" appear, we can see that they occur in conjunction with the three main functions that are associated with the traditional Mongol *quriltai*-selection of the khan, advising the khan on important matters of state, and deposing the khan.

Under 1496, the Muscovite chronicles describe the coming to Grand Prince Ivan III of an envoy, Seyid Baraş, from the "princes" of Kazan', Kal Ahmed, Orak, Sadır, and Agış (for the identification of them with the divan of *qaraçı beys*, see above). According to this account, Seyid Baraş brought a petition from them and "from all the land" to receive the grand prince's forgiveness for betraying the previous khan, Muhammed Emin. The account goes on to tell how Ivan III, "according to their petition and that of all the land," granted their request not to restore Muhammed Emin to the throne but sent Abdüllâtif, the younger brother of Muhammed Emin, instead.³³ We do not have the written petition of the Kazan' *qaraçı beys* and "all the land" to tell us what they really requested, but we can suppose it did not take the abject form as described in the highly tendentious Muscovite chronicles.

Instead, we can derive a more plausible explanation if we understand the interpretative framework within which the Muscovite writers were describing the relationship of the grand prince toward the choosing of the Khan of Kazan'. Both in the chronicles and in Herberstein's account, which derives from what he was told at the Muscovite court, we see this interpretative framework clearly. The grand prince is cast in the role of khan-maker-that is, the one who was solely responsible for choosing and installing the khan since the time of the accession of İlham (1479). Then, after a short time in each case, the grand prince becomes disenchanted with his choice as his chosen khan begins listening to nefarious advisers, committing injustices, and performing actions that are not in the best interests of Muscovy. The grand prince, reluctantly and much to his sorrow, is compelled to replace the incumbent with another khan, and the cycle of disenchantment and reluctant replacement repeats itself.³⁴

This Muscovite interpretation is one-sided and misleading. We need to look to other players besides the Muscovite grand prince, such as the Kazan' ruling class (including the divan of *qaraçı beys* and the *quriltai*, the Khan of Crimea, the Khan of Sibir', and the Nogais, who were often in a position to provide military and diplomatic support for, or in opposition to, factions within the Kazan' ruling class.³⁵ When we do so, we come to a more plausible conclusion that the Kazan' divan and *quriltai* chose Abdüllâtif as khan. At the time, Abdüllâtif was in the protective custody of the Muscovite grand prince. But Kazan' was geopolitically in an insecure situation. Although the Kazanis were able to marshal the military wherewithal to fight Muscovy on more or less equal terms on a number of occasions, any alliance among its neighbors could spell its doom.

These neighbors included, besides Muscovy to the west, the Siberian Khanate to the east, the Nogais to the south, and the Crimean Khanate to the southwest. This intermediate position, which contributed immensely to the commercial vitality of Kazan', also exposed it to potential conquest by a combination of the encircling powers. Given this situation, the foreign relations goals of the ruling class of Kazan' most likely included playing off the neighboring powers against each other, forming alliances with one or more of them as protectors, and trying to keep interference from these protecting powers in Kazan' internal affairs to a minimum. By playing the game well, the Kazan' leaders staved off ultimate conquest by a foreign power until 1552.



Tower of Süyümbüike, Kazan

Of the next 13 *quriltais* mentioned in the Muscovite chronicles, 9 involved the choosing or deposing of a khan.³⁶ No doubt there were intervening *quriltais* not mentioned in the Muscovite chronicles concerning the choice and deposition of khans. In addition, during this period, the Muscovite chronicles report five other *quriltais* concerned specifically with Muscovite relations. In 1518, the *quriltai* sent an embassy to Moscow to discuss the choice of a khan.³⁷ In 1524, 1530, and 1546, *quriltais* sent emissaries to discuss peace with Muscovy.³⁸

The last Kazan' *quriltai* mentioned in the Muscovite chronicles occurred on August 14, 1551, when "all the Kazan' land" gave an oath to Muscovy that Kazan' would not intercede on behalf of the "Mountain side" (*Gorniaia storona*)-that is, the Mountain Cheremis (Chuvash) to the west as well as the Mordvinians to the southwest of Kazan'.³⁹ In order to understand the significance of this oath, we need to take a look at the ethnic composition of the Kazan' polity's vassal peoples.


The boundaries of the Khanate of Kazan', like the boundaries of other western steppe khanates, were never clearly defined. The Kazan' polity consisted of the central government located in Kazan' and a loose confed-



- 5 Much of this material is published in *Sbornik Imperatorskogo Russkogo istoricheskogo obshchestva (SRIO)*, 148 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1867-1916), vols. 41 and 95, which cover the period 1487-1519. Additional material can be found in A. F. Malinovskii, "Istoroicheskoe i diplomatiicheskoe sobranie del proiskhodivshikh mezhdu Rossiiskimi velikimi kniaz'iami i byvsheimi v krymu tatarskimi tsariami s 1462 po 1533 god," *Zapiski Odesskogo obshchestva istorii i drevnosti*, 5 (1863): 178-420. One can find published documents for the period 1543-1565 in *Prodolzhenie drevnei Rossiiskoi vivliofiki*, 11 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1786), vols. 6-11.
- 6 For a list of those places in the chronicles and their corresponding "box" in the *Posol'skii prikaz* as listed in S. O. Schmidt, *Opisi tsarskogo arkhiva XVI veka i Arkhiva posol'skogo prikaza 1614 goda* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Vostochnoi literatury, 1960), see Edward L. Keenan, Jr., "Muscovy and Kazan', 1445-1552: A Study in Steppe Politics" (Ph. D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1965), 401.
- 7 For the Qipchaq Khanate (*Dešt-i-Qipchaq*), see Bertold Spuler, *Die goldene Horde. Die Mongolen in Ruland* (Leipzig: Otto Harrassowitz, 1943); and Uli Schamiloglu, *The Golden Horde: Economy, Society and Civilization in Western Eurasia, 13th and 14th Centuries* (forthcoming). For the Crimean Khanate, see V. E. Syroechkovskii, "Mukhammed-Girai i ego vassaly," *Uchenye zapiski Moskovskogo ordena Lenina gosudarstvennogo universiteta im. M. V. Lomonosova*, 61: *Istoriia*, no. 2 (1940): 3-71; Beatrice Manz, "The Clans of the Crimean Khanate, 1466-1532," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, 2 (1978): 282-307; and Halil Inalcik, "The Khan and the Tribal Aristocracy: The Crimean Khanate Under Sahib Giray I," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, 3/4 (1979-1980): 445-466.
- 8 Uli Schamiloglu, "The Qarači Beys of the Later Golden Horde: Notes on the Organization of the Mongol World Empire," *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi* 4: (1984): 283-297. Given the existence of levels of social stratification of those in allegiance to each qarači bey, one finds the traditional designations of "clan" and "tribe," both of which are socially egalitarian, to be inadequate. Instead, I have adopted the proposal of the Harvard archaeologist Carl Lamberg-Karlovsky that khanates are made up of chiefdoms. C. C. Lamberg-Karlovsky, "Bronze Age Khanates of Central Asia," *Antiquity*, 68 (1994): 398-405. Each chiefdom is headed by a dominant clan, to which various groups, arranged in a social hierarchical order, owe allegiance. For the anthropological literature on the "chiefdom," see Elman R. Service, *Primitive State Organization: An Evolutionary Perspective* (New York: Random House, 1962), 143-177 and idem, *Origins of the State and Civilization* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1975), 15-16, 151-152; Fred O. Gearing, *Priests and Warriors: Social Structures for Cherokee Politics in the 18th Century* ([Mehasha, WI]: American Anthropological Society, vol. 93, 1962); and Jared Diamond, *Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fate of Human Societies* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), 273-276.
- 9 On the contributions of Mongol and Islamic law to the Kazan' legal system especially in regard to selection of the khan, see Boris Nolde, *La formation de l'empire russe. Études, notes et documents*, 2 vols. (Paris: Institut d'études slaves, 1952-1953), 1: 5-9.
- 10 Vel'iaminov-Zernov, Vernadsky, and Martin assert that Ulu Muhammed's son, Mahmud, founded the Khanate of Kazan' in 1445 and was, therefore, its first khan. V. V. Vel'iaminov-Zernov, *Issledovanie o Kasimovskikh tsariakh i tsarevichakh*, 4 vols. (St. Petersburg: Imperatorskaia Akademiia nauk, 1863-1887), 1: 11-13; and George Vernadsky, *A History of Russia*, 5 vols. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1943-1969), vol. 3: *The Mongols and Russia*, 302; and Janet Martin, *Medieval Russia 980-1584* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 219. Kurat and Temir proposed that Ulu Muhammed founded the Khanate in 1437. Akdes Nimet Kurat, *Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivindeki Altın Ordu, Kırım ve Türkistan Hanlarına ait yarlık ve bitikler* (İstanbul: Burhaneddin Matbaası, 1940), 28; idem, "Kazan Hanlığı," *Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih Coğrafya Fakültesi Dergisi* 12, 3/4 (1954): 227, 247; and Ahmet Temir, "Kazan Hanlığı," in *Türk Dünyası El Kitabı* (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1976), 933. Khudiakov proposed the year 1438 for the founding of the Khanate. M. G. Khudiakov, *Ocherki po istorii Kazanskogo khanstva* (Kazan': Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo, 1923), 33. Pelenski argues that the polity that became the Khanate of Kazan' was in the process of formation from the time that Ulu Muhammed was ousted from Sarai in 1435 to his taking up residence in Kazan' in 1445. Pelenski, *Russia and Kazan*, 23.
- 11 *PSRL* 5: 267; 6: 150; 6. 2: cols. 69-70; 8: 107; 12: 24-25; 18: 188-189; 20: 240; 23: 149-150; 24: 183; 25: 260; 26: 192-193; 27: 106-107, 272; 28: 101-102, 268; 39: 145; *Ioasafovskaia letopis'*, 28; and *Ustiuzhskii letopisnyi svod*, 78. The idea that Vasilii II, who Ulu Muhammed had decided should be grand prince in 1432 when he was Khan of the Qipchaq Khanate, should send an army commanded by Dmitrii Shemiaka and Dmitrii Krasnoi, sons of Iurii Dmitrievich, the man Ulu Muhammed had decided against, has struck some historians as odd, especially when one factors in the point which the chronicle accounts make, that is, that Ulu Muhammed came to Belev with peaceful intentions. Accordingly, these historians have suggested that Dmitrii Shemiaka and Dmitrii Krasnoi attacked Ulu Muhammed's forces without the complete approval of Vasilii II. Edward L. Keenan, Jr., "Muscovy and Kazan': Some Introductory Remarks on the Patterns of Steppe Diplomacy," *Slavic Review* 26 (1967): 555; and Martin, *Medieval Russia*, 242.
- 12 *PSRL*, 5: 267; 6: 151; 6. 2: col. 102; 8: 107; 12: 30; 15. 2: col. 491; 18: 190; 20: 240-241; 23: 150; 24: 183; 25: 260; 26: 193; 27: 107, 272; 28: 102, 268; 39: 145; *Ioasafovskaia letopis'*, 29; and *Ustiuzhskii letopisnyi svod*, 78.
- 13 The principality of Kazan' had been in existence since ca. 1297, when it had emerged as one of the successors to the Bulgar state. Azade-Ayşe Rorlich, *The Volga Tatars: A Profile in National Resilience* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986), 24.
- 14 *PSRL*, 6. 2, cols. 105-106; 8: 112-113; 12: 65; 18: 194; 20: 257-258; 25: 262-263; 26: 197-198; 27: 109; 28: 103-104; 270-271; *Ioasafovskaia letopis'*, 32-33.
- 15 Pelenski, *Russia and Kazan*, 25.
- 16 *PSRL*, 19: cols. 20, 222. Keenan has declared the *Kazanskaia istoriia* to be a work of "historical romance." Edward L. Keenan, Jr., "Coming to Grips with the Kazanskaia Istoriia: Some Observations on Old Answers and New Questions," *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U. S.* 11 (1964-1968): 183. I have not seen any significant evidence or valid argument that contravenes that assessment. Therefore, I am not using it as a primary source for the study of the Kazan' Khanate.
- 17 *PSRL*, 6. 2: col. 120; 8: 120; 12: 72-73; 18: 202; 25: 268; 26: 206; 27: 113, 273; 28: 108-109, 276; 39: 146; *Ioasafovskaia letopis'*, 32, 40-41.
- 18 See Donald Ostrowski, "The Extraordinary Career of Tsarevich Kudai Kul/Peter in the Context of Relations Between Muscovy and Kazan'," in *State, Society and Nationality: Essays in Honor of Jaroslav Pelenski* (forthcoming).
- 19 Vasilii told Appak, the envoy of the Crimean Khan, Muhammed Girey, that Şah Âli had been requested by the Kazan' princes. *SRIO*, 95: 661. Cf. *Ioasafovskaia letopis'*, 176; *PSRL*, 13: 32; 20: 389.
- 20 *SRIO*, 95: 520.
- 21 Keenan, "Muscovy and Kazan', 1445-1552," 237, 239. In addition, Muhammed Girey contested the granting by Vasilii III of Meshchera as his "yurt" to princes who had fled the Great Horde when Crimea had taken it over in 1502. These princes were related to Âbdul Kerim. *SRIO*, 95: 296, 378.
- 22 Keenan, "Muscovy and Kazan', 1445-1552," 253-254, 260-261.
- 23 *SRIO*, 95: 679.
- 24 *SRIO*, 95: 679. Muhammed Girey may also have believed that because his mother, Nur Saltan, had been married to two Kazan' khans, he had a legitimate claim to Kazan'. Muhammed Girey's claim, however, was complicated when, in 1524, an envoy of the Ottoman Empire claimed Kazan' as the yurt of Suleyman, the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire (1520-1566). *Prodolzhenie Drevne-rossiiskoi vivliofiki*, 9 (1793): 63-64. He may have done so at the behest of Sahib Girey, who after he was deposed as khan in 1525 went to Istanbul to gain Suleyman's support. For a discussion of who claimed Kazan' as their yurt and when, see Pelenski, *Russia and Kazan*, 76-87.
- 25 The only significant exception was a period of a few years in the early 1530s when Can Ali, the grandson of Bahtiar, the brother of Ahmed, the last ruler of the Great Horde, was khan. The exact dates of Can Ali's reign are in dispute. Arat and Kurat suggest 1531-1533. Smolitsch proposes 1531-1535. And Pelenski proposes 1532-1535. R. R. Arat, "Kazan," *İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, 20 vols. (İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1940-1988), 6: 511; Kurat, "Kazan Hanlığı," 247; Igor Smolitsch, "Zur Geschichte der russischen Ostpolitik des 15. und 16. Jahrhunderts," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, 6 [o. s.] (1941): 65; Pelenski, *Russia and Kazan*, 334. The only other exception was a relatively insignificant one when for a short time in 1546 Şah Âli was reinstated as khan.



- 26 Typical of the problem is the entry in the Voskresensk Chronicle for 1519 where we find: "Kulderbysh came from Kazan' to the grand prince with a document ... from the princes and qara₁s and the ichki and mirzas ... and all the Kazan' people." PSRL, 8: 266.
- 27 The usual formula in the diplomatic records is: "tsar ... i ulani ... i kniazi ... i kniazi i murzy," where the first "kniazi" are the qara₁ beys and the second are the service princes. See, e. g., SRIO, 95: 32. Likewise, some Muscovite chronicles, under the entry for 1497, report that the "kniazi kazanskii i ulani i zemskie kniazi" gave an oath to Ivan III. *Ioasafovskala letopis'*, 132; PSRL, 12: 243-244. The "kniazi kazanskii" should be understood as the qara₁ beys and the "zemskie kniazi" should be understood as the local princes, who were members of the middle and lower ruling class. But see Keenan, "Muscovy and Kazan', 1445-1552," 91-93, who has a different understanding.
- 28 PSRL, 8: 266; 13: 32. Subsequent references to Prince Bulat until 1542 in the Voskresensk and Nikon chronicles and the *Tsarstvennaya kniga*, although not designating him a qara₁, do place him in situations commensurate with those a qara₁ might find himself. See PSRL, 8: 273 (1530), 276 (1531), 282 (1533), 291 (1536), 295 (1541); 13: 47 (1530), 56-57 (1531-1532), 69 (1533), 88 (1536), 99 (1541), 100, 105 (1536-1541), 142 (1542); and 13: 424-425 (1536), 433 (1541), and 440 (1542).
- 29 PSRL, 13: 161, 463.
- 30 PSRL, 13: 171, 471.
- 31 Khudiakov, *Ocherki po istorii Kazanskogo khanstva*, 191-195.
- 32 For more on the *Zemskii sobor*, see Donald Ostrowski, "The Assembly of the Land (*Zemskii sobor*) as a Representative Institution," in *Modernization in Early Modern Russia*, ed. Jarmo Kotilaine and Marshall Poe (forthcoming).
- 33 PSRL, 6: 41; 8: 232; 12: 243; 20: 364; 24: 213; 26: 290; 28: 328; 39: 171; and *Ioasafovskala letopis'*, 131-132.
- 34 *Pamiatniki diplomattcheskikh snoshenii drevnei Rossii s derzhavami inostrannymi* (PDS), 1: 288-289; SRIO, 35: 530-531; Gerbershtein, *Zapiski*, 170-171; Herberstein, *Notes*, 2: 58-59. The son of Ivan III, Vasilii III, described a similar version in a letter to Sultan Suleyman in 1521. SRIO, 95: 695-696. In 1535, in instructions to a diplomatic mission to Lithuania, Vasilii III reasserted the notion that the Muscovite grand prince was the only one who had decided who would be khan in Kazan' "from the beginning" (*iz nachala*). SRIO, 59: 26.
- 35 Cf. Keenan, "Muscovy and Kazan', 1445-1552," 178-179.
- 36 In 1516, the Kazan' *quriltai* chose Abdullatif as khan. PSRL, 8: 260; 13: 25; 28: 351. In 1519, it chose Shah Ali as khan. PSRL, 8: 267; 13: 32. In 1531, it deposed Khan Sefa Grey. PSRL, 8: 276; 13: 54-55. Later in 1531, another *quriltai* chose Can Ali as khan. PSRL, 8: 277; 13: 55. In 1535, a *quriltai* deposed Can Ali. PSRL, 8: 291; 13: 88, 424; 29: 20. In 1541, a *quriltai* discussed deposing Sefa Grey as khan. PSRL, 8: 295; 13: 100. In 1546, a *quriltai* once again chose Shah Ali as khan. PSRL, 13: 148-149, 447-448; 29: 47-48. In 1551, it deposed Otemiş Grey and chose Shah Ali as khan. PSRL, 13: 167, 468; 29: 64.
- 37 PSRL, 8: 266; 13: 31.
- 38 For the mission of 1524, see PSRL, 8: 271; 13: 44. For that of 1530, see PSRL, 8: 274; 13: 47. For the one of 1546, see PSRL, 13: 149, 450.
- 39 PSRL, 13: 169, 470; 29: 65.
- 40 I am accepting here David Christian's suggestion that we use the term "pastoralists" instead of "nomads" for those groups who depended more on livestock for subsistence than on mobility. David Christian, *A History of Russia, Central Asia and Mongolia*, vol. 1: *Inner Eurasia from Prehistory to the Mongol Empire* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 81.
- 41 Keenan, "Muscovy and Kazan', 1445-1552," 80.
- 42 Rorlich, *Volga Tatars*, 31.



THE TURKS

2

MIDDLE AGES

EDITORS

HAŞAN CELÂL GÜZEL

C. CEM OĞUZ OSMAN KARATAY

YENİ TÜRKİYE PUBLICATIONS