

*The Move of the Metropolitan from Kiev in 1299**

DONALD OSTROWSKI

The chronicles report that in 1299 the metropolitan of Kiev moved his residence to Volodimir-on-the-Kliazma.¹ Subsequently, the metropolitan took up residence in Moscow with enormous consequences for the political and religious history of the Rus' land. Historians have expressed diverse opinions concerning the circumstances of the move of the metropolitanate from Kiev. Since no survey of those opinions has been made, and since historians have expressed their views, for the most part, in isolation without reference to previous historiography on this issue, it may be worthwhile to survey that historiography briefly.

* * *

N. M. Karamzin, in his *History of the Russian State*, follows the chronicle account in writing that Metropolitan Maksim (1282–1305) went with his entourage (*klirosom*) to Volodimir and

* An earlier version of this article appeared as "Why Did the Metropolitan Move from Kiev to Vladimir in the Thirteenth Century?" in *California Slavic Studies*, vol. 16, 1993, pp. 83–101.

¹ Most of the chronicles agree that the move occurred in 6807, that is, sometime between March 1, 1299 and February 28, 1300. The Laurentian and the Simeonov Chronicles, which place it under the year 6808, and the Kholmogory Chronicle, which has it under 6805, disagree. See *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei (PSRL)*, 38 vols., St. Petersburg/Petrograd/Leningrad and Moscow, 1843–1989, vol. 1 (2nd ed.), col. 485, vol. 18, p. 84, and vol. 33, p. 77. But these differences can be attributed, in the case of 6808, to an ultra-March dating and, in the case of 6805, to scribal error. Through the fourteenth century, Rus' chroniclers used either the ultra-March or March year, with the latter predominating. See N. G. Berezkhov, *Khronologiiia russkogo letopisaniia*, Moscow, 1963, pp. 122, 322–323, fn. 168. In addition, two sixteenth-century chronicles, the Voskresensk and the Typography, mention April 18 as the date Maksim arrived in Volodimir. *PSRL*, vol. 7, p. 182 and *PSRL*, vol. 24, p. 106. The absence of such a date in other and earlier chronicles, however, makes that date suspect. The Mazurin Chronicle records the move under the year 6791 (1282/83) and changes Maksim's destination to Moscow. *PSRL*, vol. 31, p. 77. See also M. N. Tikhomirov, *Kratkie zametki o letopisnykh proizvedeniiakh v rukopisnykh sobraniiaakh Moskvy*, Moscow, 1962, pp. 51–52. We can dismiss both the assertions of this chronicle as faulty interpolations.

that “the majority of Kiev’s inhabitants fled to other towns.”² Karamzin asserts that Maksim left Kiev so as not to be a martyr and victim of the intolerable Mongol tyranny. If that is the reason the metropolitan left Kiev, then it is not clear why he would wait until 1299, when Mongol control in the area was declining and the Lithuanians were moving into the area. S. M. Solov’ev, in contrast, sees the move of 1299 being prepared already under Metropolitan Kirill (1242–1280): “when the significance of Kiev and Southern, Dnepr Rus’ declined conclusively,” Kirill “turned greater attention to Northern Rus’.”³ In support of this assertion, Solov’ev cites chronicle references to Kirill’s travels to Chernigov, Riazan’, the Suzdal’ land, and Great Novgorod, as well as references to Kirill’s being in Volodimir in 1255 and at Nevskii’s funeral in 1263, “after which he went to Kiev; the chronicler speaks about his return from there [to the Council of Volodimir] under 1274.”⁴ Solov’ev also mentions Kirill’s travel from Kiev to Pereiaslavl’-Zaleskii where he died, and that he “was buried in Kiev.” Solov’ev concludes, rather ambiguously:

If on the basis of this information we do not have the right to say that Kirill transferred the [metropolitan’s] residence from Kiev to Volodimir, then at least we see that he appears in the north several times and very probably that he lived here if not more, then as much as in the south.⁵

When Maksim became metropolitan, according to Solov’ev, he “at first indicated that the capital of the Rus’ metropolitanate should remain in Kiev.”⁶ Solov’ev mentions that the chroniclers attribute the move to Volodimir to Maksim’s wish to avoid violence from the Tatars in Kiev. But then Solov’ev raises the question whether that violence was worse in 1299 than earlier. He

² N. M. Karamzin, *Istoriia gosudarstva rossiiskogo*, 12 vols., St. Petersburg, 1892, vol. 4, p. 106.

³ S. M. Solov’ev, *Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen*, 29 vols. in 15 bks., Moscow, 1960, vol. 3, p. 562.

⁴ Solov’ev, *Istoriia Rossii*, vol. 3, p. 563.

⁵ Solov’ev, *Istoriia Rossii*, vol. 3, p. 563.

⁶ Solov’ev, *Istoriia Rossii*, vol. 3, p. 563.

concludes that “Maksim made a decisive, final step clearly testifying to the fact that the vital forces had completely poured out (*otliti*) from the south to the north.”⁷

The idea that a large transfer of population occurred during this time shows up in the work of V. O. Kliuchevskii who writes that Kievan Rus’ “was completely devastated as a result of the Mongol incursions.” Kliuchevskii seems to consider these incursions as only the final blow to the emptying of Kievan Rus’, which he sees as having been going on since the mid-twelfth century. This situation, he continues, led to the “flight of the Kievan population northwards,” which carried the metropolitan with it.⁸ As evidence to support his assertion, Kliuchevskii refers to the chronicles’ description of the move of Metropolitan Maksim in 1299. He then quotes from the chronicle that “all the city of Kiev did flee also.” Kliuchevskii does imply that some people either remained in Kiev or returned at a later time, because he writes that “the disturbed state of the times rendered care of the South Russian pastorate as necessary as ever, . . . so that the metropolitan had to make frequent journeys to the south to visit his Kievan eparchies.”⁹ One finds at least three problematic aspects of Kliuchevskii’s depiction. He does not acknowledge Solov’ev’s description of earlier activities in the north of the metropolitanate under Kirill, Maksim’s predecessor. Also, he seems so convinced that a mass movement of population from Kiev to the northeast occurred that he overlooks the fact that the chronicle entry relates only that “all Kiev fled” (*razbězhesia*), but does not indicate a direction.¹⁰ In fact, the only direct evidence we

⁷ Solov’ev, *Istoriia Rossii*, vol. 3, p. 564.

⁸ V. O. Kliuchevskii, *Sochineniia*, 8 vols., Moscow, 1956–1959, vol. 2: *Kurs russkoi istorii*, pt. 2, p. 23.

⁹ Kliuchevskii, *Sochineniia*, vol. 2, p. 24.

¹⁰ *PSRL*, vol. 1 (2nd ed.), col. 485; *PSRL*, vol. 7, p. 182; *PSRL*, vol. 18, p. 84; *PSRL*, vol. 24, p. 106. See also *PSRL*, vol. 10, p. 172 (where *razbězhesia* has been changed to *razydesia*). Cf. *PSRL*, vol. 3, p. 130; *PSRL*, vol. 4, p. 46; and *PSRL*, vol. 5, p. 203. Earlier in this work, Kliuchevskii discusses what he believes is evidence for the migration. Kliuchevskii, *Sochineniia*, vol. 1, pp. 282–291. The view that some kind of mass migration of people from Kiev fleeing to the northeast, where they became the basis of the Great Russian nationality, had been given fuller exposition in the works of Solov’ev and M. P. Pogodin. See, esp., the latter’s “Zapiska o drevnem iazyke russkom (pis’mo k I. I. Sreznevskomu),” *Izvestie Akademii nauk po Otdeleniiu russkogo iazyka i slovesnosti*, vol. 5, pt. 2, 1856, pp. 70–92. For a discussion of the development of this schema, see Natalia Polońska-Vasylenko, *Two Conceptions of the History of Ukraine and Russia*, London, 1968, pp. 30–37. Also see Mykhailo S. Hrushevs’kyj, “Zvy-

have of anyone's moving from Kiev to the northeast during the last half of the thirteenth century is the chronicle account of the move of the metropolitan and his entourage. Kliuchevskii makes no effort to account for the apparent time delay between the Mongol sack of Kiev in 1240 and the move of the metropolitan fifty-nine years later. If conditions in Kiev were so bad, one would think that the metropolitan would have moved sooner.

E. E. Golubinskii is in agreement with Solov'ev's suggestion that Kirill resided as much in the north as in the south, but makes no reference to Solov'ev's work. He asserts that Metropolitan Kirill left Kiev because it was "unsafe for habitation,"¹¹ and, at first, divided his time between the grand prince of Galicia, Danylo, and the grand prince of Rus', Aleksandr Nevskii. Furthermore, Golubinskii decides that Kirill lived more or less continuously in the north between 1250 and 1263. It was only after the death of Nevskii, in his view, that Kirill returned to Kiev.¹² Golubinskii argues that the vacancy of the Volodimir eparchy until 1274 is evidence that Kirill was contemplating an official move of the metropolitan's residence there.¹³ Then, in 1299, Metropolitan Maksim, fleeing Tatar attacks, which dispersed the entire town of Kiev, sought refuge in

chaina skhema 'russkoi istorii' i sprava ratsional'noho ukladu istorii skhidn'oho slavianstva," *Sbornik statei po slavianovedeniiu*, ed. V. I. Lamanskii, St. Petersburg, 1904, pp. 298–304; reprinted as "The Traditional System of 'Russian' History and the Problem of a Rational Organization of the History of Eastern Slavs," in *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.*, vol. 2, 1952, pp. 355–364. Besides the lack of direct evidence for such a large transfer of population, it would seem unlikely the people of Kiev, if they were fleeing the Mongols, would flee to an area the Mongols already controlled. Furthermore, as the archaeologist A. A. Spitsyn has argued: "the possibility of the migration of the population along the Dnepr to the far north is completely inadmissible" since it would involve their abandonment "of abundant black soil for clay and sand, the comfortable for the demanding, the steppe for the forest, the warm for the cold, bountiful harvests for sparse ones, the ox for the horse, the cottage for the hut, large villages for isolated settlements, easy work for hard labor." A. Spitsyn, "Istoriko-arkheologicheskie razyskanie," *Zhurnal Ministerstva narodnogo prosveshchenie*, 1909, no. 1, p. 95.

¹¹ E. E. Golubinskii, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2 vols., Moscow, 1900–1911, vol. 2, pp. 55, 56.

¹² Golubinskii, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, vol. 2, p. 57.

¹³ Golubinskii, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, vol. 2, pp. 57–58.

Volodimir.¹⁴ Thus, Golubinskii argues for three moves: from Kiev to Volodimir around 1250, from Volodimir to Kiev after 1263, then back to Volodimir in 1299. But he provides no rationale for why Kirill, if he had established himself in Volodimir in the 1250's, would want to move back to Kiev in the 1260's, especially if Kiev was so unsafe.

Although Mykhailo S. Hrushevs'kyj does not accept the idea of some kind of migration of the population to the northeast, he does see what he considers to be Tatar "terror" (*popolokh*) at the end of 1299 or beginning of 1300 to be the cause of the metropolitan's transfer of official residence.¹⁵ According to Hrushevs'kyj, the metropolitan felt unwelcome in Kiev after the sack of 1240 and "traveled from capital to capital." Thus, while Kirill was invested as metropolitan in Kiev in 1250, he immediately visited Chernigov, Riazan', and Volodimir-on-the-Kliazma that same year, then Novgorod in 1251, and Volodimir again in 1252. Hrushevs'kyj states that Kirill returned to Kiev later in life where he resided "for some time" before returning again to Volodimir. While both Kirill and Maksim gave Kiev as their official residence, they resided most of the time in Volodimir, which is why no bishop was appointed in Volodimir until 1274. In this reasoning and in the assertion of multiple moves back and forth between Kiev and the north, Hrushevs'kyj is in agreement with Golubinskii. Hrushevs'kyj, however, goes beyond Golubinskii when he argues that the chronicle account was only a "*pièce justificative*" that camouflaged a more substantial reason for the transfer. He cites *The Decision of the Patriarchal Council of 1354 Concerning the Transfer of the See of the Rus' Metropolitanate from Kiev to Vladimir*, which states that the metropolitan moved from Kiev due to the "heavy pressure of the neighboring Alamanni" (presumably a reference to the Lithuanians). Furthermore, the *Council Decision of 1354* goes on to state that the metropolitan could no longer maintain himself in Kiev because it "had come under extremely impoverished conditions" (*prishel v kraine bedstvennoe sostaianie*),

¹⁴ Golubinskii, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, vol. 2, p. 95.

¹⁵ Mykhailo S. Hrushevs'kyj, *Istoriia Ukraïni-Rusi*, 2nd ed., 8 vols., L'viv, 1905–1913, vol. 3, p. 190.

and the means of support were “entirely insufficient” to maintain the metropolitan there. The move to Volodimir was made specifically because it was “a certain and sure source of income.”¹⁶ Hrushevs’kyj concludes that the metropolitan left Kiev as the result of Kiev’s losing its prestige as the political center of Rus’ and thus its financial base as well.¹⁷ While we must certainly include the Lithuanians among the possible causes for the metropolitan’s decision, the absence of any reference to the Tatars in the *Council Decision of 1354* is significant. Presumably the *Decision* was written under the influence of Metropolitan Aleksei of Moscow who may have been projecting his own concerns back some five decades. In other words, whether the chronicle account or the *Council Decision of 1354* is the *pièce justificative* is an open question. Finally, the suggestion of Golubinskii and Hrushevs’kyj that Kirill moved back to Kiev for a time seems to be based on no evidence other than the need to explain why a bishop was appointed to the eparchy of Volodimir in 1274 although none had been appointed for many years preceding.

M. D. Priselkov, in contrast to the multiple-move hypothesis of Golubinskii and Hrushevs’kyj, suggests that Kirill resided in Volodimir from 1250 on, and made only infrequent trips south to Kiev.¹⁸ D. S. Likhachev follows Priselkov on this point and offers a possible explanation for why the metropolitan would move north in the 1250’s—the agreement between Danylo and the papacy according to which Danylo would receive the title of king. Likhachev argues that this agreement “was not able to meet and did not meet with sympathy among the Rus’ clergy.”¹⁹ He concludes that Kirill moved to the north in opposition to the policies of union with Catholicism

¹⁶ “1354 g. Opređenje patriarshogo sobora o perenesenii kafedry russkoi metropolii iz Kieva vo Vladimir,” *Russkaia istoricheskaia biblioteka*, vol. 6, supplement, cols. 63–66. See also *Acta patriarchatus Constantinopolitani*, eds. Franz Miklosich and Joseph Müller, 2 vols., Vienna, 1862, vol. 1, pp. 351–352.

¹⁷ Hrushevs’kyj, *Istoriia Ukraïni-Rusi*, vol. 3, p. 191.

¹⁸ M. D. Priselkov, *Istoriia russkogo letopisaniia XI–XV vv.*, Leningrad, 1940, pp. 104–105.

¹⁹ D. S. Likhachev, “Galitskaia literaturnogo traditsiia v zhitii Aleksandra Nevskogo,” *Trudy Otdela drevnerusskoi literatury*, vol. 5, 1947, p. 51. Fennell seems to be in agreement with Likhachev’s interpretation. See John Fennell, *The Crisis of Medieval Russia 1200–1304*, London, 1983, pp. 103, 112.

that Danylo seemed to be undertaking. George Vernadsky asserts that Kirill found “Kiev completely devastated and unsuitable for the establishment of the diocesan administration” and, therefore, “went to East Russia instead.”²⁰ Vernadsky adds that Kirill’s “disapproval of Daniel’s negotiations with the pope was an additional motive for his decision.” Steven Runciman places the initial leaving of the metropolitan in the twelfth century. He asserts that, after Andrei Bogoliubskii’s sack of Kiev in 1169, the metropolitan had “to reside in the capital of whatever Grand Prince was dominant at the moment.” This “nomadic life” of the metropolitan, according to Runciman, “weakened the organization of the Church.”²¹ Iu. A. Limonov, in contrast, asserts that Kirill went to Volodimir in 1250 and “remained in the northeast for the entire period of the reign of Aleksandr Nevskii.”²² But Limonov cites only two of Kirill’s activities in the north (his coming with Nevskii to Novgorod in 1251 and his participation in the ceremony when Nevskii became prince of Volodimir in 1252) to support his assertion.²³ Limonov does not explicitly say whether he believes Kirill returned to Kiev after the death of Nevskii or remained in Volodimir. None of these historians, from Priselkov to Limonov, attempts to explain, or even acknowledge the existence of, the chronicle entry concerning the move of the metropolitan from Kiev in 1299.

Ivan Wlasowsky, in his history of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, also asserts that Kirill “rarely visited Kiev, residing most of the time in Vladimir on the river Kliazma,” but stops short of arguing that Kirill transferred the metropolitan’s official residence there. Instead, Wlasowsky states that Kirill “prepared the groundwork for the formal transfer.”²⁴ His interpretation is a decidedly nationalistic one. He sees a similarity between Kirill’s activities as metropolitan and

²⁰ George Vernadsky, *A History of Russia*, 5 vols., New Haven, 1943–1969, vol. 3, *The Mongols and Russia*, p. 147.

²¹ Steven Runciman, “Byzantium, Russia and Caesaropapism,” *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, vol. 2, 1957, p. 6.

²² Iu. A. Limonov, *Letopisanie Vladimiro-Suzdal’skoi Rusi*, Leningrad, 1967, p. 169.

²³ Limonov, *Letopisanie Vladimiro-Suzdal’skoi Rusi*, p. 170.

²⁴ Ivan Vlasovs’kyi [Wlasowsky], *Narys istorii Ukraïns’koï pravoslavnoi tserkvy*, vol. 1, (IX–XVII), New York, 1955, p. 102.

subsequent “Ukrainian Church prelates who . . . played a significant role in the political strengthening and cultural improvement of the Muscovites.” In this, Wlasowsky is referring to the period after 1649 when Ukrainian and Belorussian clerics went north to Muscovy.²⁵

Furthermore, Wlasowsky refers to unnamed “Russian historians” who “explain . . . [the move of the metropolitan] by the decline of Kiev, the constant disturbances of the Tatars in the south, and the need of the metropolitan’s counsel and administration in the north where Church life was rising and spreading in the new state. . . .” He disputes the last point of the “Russian historians” by arguing that “there were also demands of Church life in the Galician-Volynian state” where the Tatars were not so strong and where “pressure against Orthodoxy had begun to be exerted by the Latin Church.”²⁶ He, thus, seems to implicitly accept the first two points, which concern the need for the metropolitan to move from Kiev, but does not agree with the last point, the reason for the direction of the move.

Wlasowsky does not provide any other explanation for the direction but suggests that, in moving north, the metropolitan had betrayed Ukrainian state interests, which Wlasowsky associates with Galicia-Volynia: “Because of its political position and also because of the greater distance from the Tatar Horde, Ukrainian culture was able to develop at this time only in the Galician-Volynian state, which embraced exclusively Ukrainian territories with a Ukrainian population. . . .”²⁷ Then he speculates that the princes of Galicia and Volynia, Danylo and Vasyl’ko, nominated Kirill “for the good of their people and their state and not for the Suzdalian north.” He concludes that Kirill, although “born a Ukrainian in Galicia and an able prelate, did

²⁵ Wlasowsky, *Narys istorii*, p. 102. For Ukrainian influence on Muscovy in the seventeenth century, see K. V. Kharlampovich, *Malorossiiskoe vliianie na velikoruskuiu tserkovnuiu zhizn'*, Kazan', 1914. See also Frank B. Kortschmaryk, *The Kievan Academy and Its Role in the Organization of Education in Russia at the Turn of the Seventeenth Century*, New York, 1976.

²⁶ Wlasowsky, *Narys istorii*, p. 102.

²⁷ Wlasowsky, *Narys istorii*, pp. 101–102.

not fulfill the hopes and expectations of the Galician-Volynian princes.”²⁸ Wlasowsky repeats this same argument in regard to the nomination of Peter as metropolitan in 1305 who “as a son of the Galician lands” it was expected would “care for the church-religious life of his own people.” But their “expectations, as in the case of Kirill III, were not fulfilled” because Peter went north to help Ivan Kalita and “the realization of his political-state plans.”²⁹ Given that Kirill betrayed Ukrainian state interests, Wlasowsky deems it appropriate that “Maksim, followed in his footsteps, all the more so since he was a Greek who had been sent from Constantinople and thus felt no particular connection to Kiev or moral obligation to the Ukrainian people.”³⁰ What Wlasowsky does not provide is a motivation for this “betrayal” on the part of the metropolitans, in particular Kirill and Peter, who for Wlasowsky are the apparent villains in this drama of nationalistic betrayal. It is doubtful, however, that anybody in the thirteenth century was thinking in terms of Ukrainian-versus-Russian state interests.

One of the few historians to deal directly with other historians’ interpretations on this issue has been Joseph Fuhrmann. He challenged Priselkov and Likhachev’s suggestion that Kirill resided more or less permanently in the north by pointing out that the Nikon Chronicle entry for 1280 states that Metropolitan Kirill, “as was his custom, left from Kiev and travelled to all the towns of Rus’.” Fuhrmann also states that the entry for 1274 indicates that Kirill left Kiev to hold a council in Volodimir.³¹ Besides these two entries, he could also have pointed to the entry

²⁸ Wlasowsky, *Narys istorii*, p. 102.

²⁹ Wlasowsky, *Narys istorii*, p. 104.

³⁰ Wlasowsky, *Narys istorii*, p. 102.

³¹ Joseph T. Fuhrmann, “Metropolitan Cyril II (1242–1281) and the Politics of Accommodation,” *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, vol. 24, 1976, pp. 166–167, n. 29. More exactly, the chronicles do not mention Kirill’s going to Volodimir for the Council of 1274, although that is the likely reason he traveled from Kiev. They only mention his going with Serapion and appointing him bishop of Volodimir, Suzdal’, and Nizhnii Novgorod. For the entry of 1280 cited by Fuhrmann, see *PSRL*, vol. 10, p. 157. But compare *PSRL*, vol. 7, p. 174; *PSRL*, vol. 18, p. 77; *PSRL*, vol. 20, p. 168; *PSRL*, vol. 24, p. 102; *PSRL*, vol. 25, p. 152; *PSRL*, vol. 30, p. 96, where the entry merely states: “Metropolitan Kirill came from Kiev to the Suzdal’ land.” For the entry of 1274, see *PSRL*, vol. 7, p. 172; *PSRL*, vol. 10, p. 152; *PSRL*, vol. 15 (2nd ed.), pt. 2, col. 404; *PSRL*, vol. 18, p. 74; *PSRL*, vol. 20, p. 168; *PSRL*, vol. 23, p. 89; *PSRL*, vol. 25, p. 151; *PSRL*, vol. 28, pt. 1, p. 61; *PSRL*, vol. 28, pt. 2, p. 220; *PSRL*, vol. 30, p. 95;

under 1274 where the Novgorod I Chronicle reports that “they [the Novgorodians] sent Kliment to Kiev for confirmation.”³² Under 1276, the chronicles state that Kirill consecrated Kliment in Kiev.³³ In addition, when Kirill died in Pereiaslavl’-Zalesskii in 1280, the chronicles report that “they bore him to Kiev.”³⁴ If the metropolitan’s residence had been in Volodimir, then there would have been no reason to transport his body to Kiev. The Nikon Chronicle treats Maksim, Kirill’s successor, the same way: in 1284 “all the bishops of Rus’ were summoned to Kiev to Maksim.”³⁵ One notes that Maksim does not leave Volodimir to go to Kiev; the other bishops come to him in Kiev. Under 1285, some chronicles report that “Metropolitan Maksim came from Kiev to Novgorod.”³⁶ Finally, the chronicles report indicate that other bishops besides Kliment were consecrated in Kiev.³⁷ If the metropolitan had moved to Volodimir as early as 1250, then we would have to explain why the chronicles place the move in 1299, a full forty-nine years later and why they continue to treat Kiev as the *de facto* as well as *de jure* residence of the metropolitan.

and *Troitskaia letopis’*. *Rekonstruktsiia teksta* (hereafter *TL*), ed. M. D. Priselkov, Moscow and Leningrad, 1950, p. 332. Fuhrmann, in what must be a typographical error, refers the reader to *PSRL*, vol. 2, col. 476. But there is no such information in that (the Hypatian) chronicle.

³² *Novgorodskaia pervaiia letopis’*. *Starshego i mladshego izvodov* (hereafter *NPL*), ed. M. N. Tikhomirov, Moscow and Leningrad, 1950, p. 323. Cf. *PSRL*, vol. 10, p. 152, which provides a more elaborate rendition.

³³ *PSRL*, vol. 5, pt. 2, p. 199; *PSRL*, vol. 10, p. 153; *PSRL*, vol. 20, p. 168; *PSRL*, vol. 25, p. 151; *PSRL*, vol. 28, pt. 1, p. 61; *PSRL*, vol. 28, pt. 2, p. 220; and *NPL*, p. 323. No reason is offered why it would take two years from the time Kliment was sent to Kiev to the time when he was consecrated and returned to Novgorod.

³⁴ *PSRL*, vol. 7, p. 175; *PSRL*, vol. 10, p. 158; *PSRL*, vol. 18, p. 77; *PSRL*, vol. 20, p. 169; *PSRL*, vol. 23, p. 91; *PSRL*, vol. 24, p. 102; *PSRL*, vol. 25, p. 153; *PSRL*, vol. 28, pt. 1, p. 61; *PSRL*, vol. 28, pt. 2, p. 221; *PSRL*, vol. 30, p. 96; and *TL*, p. 338. See also *NPL*, p. 324.

³⁵ *PSRL*, vol. 10, p. 162.

³⁶ *PSRL*, vol. 23, p. 93; *PSRL*, vol. 28, pt. 1, p. 63; *PSRL*, vol. 28, pt. 2, p. 222. The Nikon Chronicle reports that in 1285 Maksim “according to his custom traveled throughout the Rus’ land.” *PSRL*, vol. 10, p. 166. Other chronicles also report that Maksim came to Novgorod but do not say from whence he came. *PSRL*, vol. 5, pt. 2, p. 201; *PSRL*, vol. 7, p. 178; *PSRL*, vol. 25, p. 156.

³⁷ For the consecration of Iakov in Kiev in 1288, see *PSRL*, vol. 10, p. 167. For the consecration of Taras in Kiev in 1289, see *PSRL*, vol. 10, p. 167. For the consecration of Andrei in Kiev in 1289, see *PSRL*, vol. 7, p. 179; *PSRL*, vol. 10, p. 167; *PSRL*, vol. 18, p. 82; *PSRL*, vol. 20, p. 171; *PSRL*, vol. 24, p. 105; *PSRL*, vol. 25, p. 157; *PSRL*, vol. 30, p. 98; and *TL*, p. 344.

John Meyendorff acknowledges that Kirill “had transferred the centre of . . . [his] activities as metropolitan to the north-east . . . and to Novgorod.”³⁸ But Meyendorff asserts that the metropolitan did not reside there officially, nor did he reside in Kiev: “he [the metropolitan] had not resided in Kiev since the Mongol conquest. . . .”³⁹ Thus, if one understands Meyendorff correctly, the metropolitan had no official residence from 1240 to 1299. Instead, because Kirill’s activities in the north are “mentioned so often in the chronicles” Meyendorff concludes “that he undoubtedly sojourned there for several consecutive years.”⁴⁰ He points out that although Danylo appointed Kirill as metropolitan, Kirill “did not feel bound by the policies of his princely sponsor.”⁴¹ But the “decisive shift” that Kirill made to the northeast “could not possibly be a purely personal decision.”⁴² Meyendorff does not see it as a betrayal of Galicia, as Wlasowsky does, because Kirill “promoted the unity” of the Galician princes with those in the north through royal marriages. Nor does Meyendorff think the shift can be explained by any “anti-Western sympathies” on the part of Kirill. Instead, he proposes “wider and long-term considerations of *Realpolitik*,”⁴³ among which were that a “vast majority” of the metropolitan’s flock was now under control of the Kipchak Khanate and that “tradition and canonical ties” of Rus’ with Byzantium “could only be enhanced by a policy of loyalty to the Mongol empire.”⁴⁴ Meyendorff cites the Laurentian Chronicle for the establishment by Maksim of “his permanent residence in

³⁸ John Meyendorff, *Byzantium and the Rise of Russia: A Study of Byzantino-Russian Relations in the Fourteenth Century*, Cambridge, 1981, p. 43.

³⁹ Meyendorff, *Byzantium and the Rise of Russia*, pp. 78–79.

⁴⁰ Meyendorff, *Byzantium and the Rise of Russia*, p. 42. Meyendorff mentions some of these activities in the north: traveling to Volodimir in 1250; celebrating the marriage of the grand prince Andrew with Danylo’s daughter in 1251; “close ties” with Aleksandr Nevskii; presiding over Nevskii’s funeral in Volodimir in 1263; and dying in Pereiaslavl’-Zalesskii in 1281.

⁴¹ Meyendorff, *Byzantium and the Rise of Russia*, p. 42.

⁴² Meyendorff, *Byzantium and the Rise of Russia*, p. 43.

⁴³ Meyendorff, *Byzantium and the Rise of Russia*, p. 44.

⁴⁴ Meyendorff, *Byzantium and the Rise of Russia*, p. 44.

Vladimir” in 1300.⁴⁵ He recaps without editorial comment the reason given by the chronicler for the move, that is, “that Tatar devastations made his sojourn in Kiev impossible.”⁴⁶ Subsequently, Meyendorff accepts the claim of the *Council Decision of 1354* that Aleksei’s predecessors resided in the north “because ancient Kiev, destroyed and impoverished, could not provide them with prestige or subsistence.”⁴⁷ While Meyendorff is the first investigator to emphasize the importance of Byzantine-Mongol relations as a significant component of the decision to move the metropolitan’s residence, he leaves unasked several obvious questions. In particular, why could not the metropolitan have promoted unity from Galicia? Why was Volodimir the city of choice rather than, say, Novgorod or Tver’? And he does not consider why Maksim would establish the metropolitan’s official residence in the northeast when he did rather than earlier or later.

Sophia Senyk sees at least three reasons for the metropolitan’s move: (1) “Kiev [had] lost all political importance” during the course of the thirteenth century; (2) “its location exposed it to raids and it had no strong defenses”; and (3) administering the far-flung independent Rus’ principalities “rendered necessary personal visits to the different parts of the metropolitanate.” These visits were made more difficult by “the disruptions caused by invasion,” in addition to the already existing climatic problems that made spring and fall travel impossible.⁴⁸ Although Senyk points to the statement in John of Plano Carpini’s *Ystoria Mongalorum* that “scarce 200 houses” remained in Kiev after the sack of 1240, she places more emphasis on other statements in that work about Carpini’s “having discussions in Kiev with the ‘millenarius’ (that is, the *tysjackij*) and other nobles, and of merchants in Kiev from Poland, Austria, and Constantinople.” From

⁴⁵ Meyendorff, *Byzantium and the Rise of Russia*, p. 46.

⁴⁶ Meyendorff, *Byzantium and the Rise of Russia*, p. 46, fn. 33.

⁴⁷ Meyendorff, *Byzantium and the Rise of Russia*, p. 167. Meyendorff warns only that the time of issuance of the *Decision* needs to be seen in the context of Moscow’s conflict with Lithuania in the middle of the fourteenth century.

⁴⁸ Sophia Senyk, *A History of the Church in Ukraine*, vol. 1: *To the End of the Thirteenth Century*, Rome, Pontificio Istituto Orientale, 1993 [= *Orientalia Christiana Analecta*, no. 243], p. 444.

this, she concludes that “[t]he local administration, thus, remained on the spot, and there were enough inhabitants to make it worth their while for merchants to bring their wares to sell.”⁴⁹ She also points out that “masonry churches” survived the sack of 1240, as did manuscripts, whose survival is testified to by their being “lent out for copying elsewhere, like the *Kormčaja* sent to Rjazan’ in 1284.”⁵⁰ As a result, according to her, it was “a new incursion [when] the Tatars again laid Kiev and its environs waste” in 1299 that led Maksim to decide that he had had enough of Tatar violence and to move to the Suzdalian land.⁵¹

While Senyk does make an attempt to explain why the metropolitan maintained his residence in Kiev for almost 60 years after the sack of Kiev in 1240, the reasons she gives for why the move took place at all are insufficient. First, although Kiev had lost its political importance, it still maintained its religious importance. The loss of political importance was not enough in itself to cause the metropolitan to move his residence, whereas the traditional religious importance of Kiev would have exerted a strong pull on the metropolitan to remain there. Second, there is no evidence of any Mongol raids on Kiev after 1240 and before 1299. In contrast, we have abundant evidence of Mongol raids on the towns of northeastern Rus’ during that time. Maksim, if he was expecting a respite from Tatar raids, would not get it by moving to Volodimir. And third, the metropolitan would have just as much difficulty traveling around Rus’ from Volodimir as from Kiev. Kiev at least had the advantage of being closer to Galicia and Volynia,

⁴⁹ Senyk, *A History of the Church in Ukraine*, p. 447. The Latin text of the *Ystoria Mongalorum* has Carpini meeting “Nongrat centurionem” (Nongrat the *sotnik*, or commander of a hundred-man unit), not the *tysiatskii*. Fr. Iohannes de Plano Carpini, “Ystoria Mongalorum,” in *Sinica Franciscana*, vol. 1: *Itinera et relationes fratrum minorum saeculi XIII et XIV*, ed. P. Anastasius van den Wyngaert, Firenze, 1929, p. 128.

⁵⁰ Senyk, *A History of the Church in Ukraine*, pp. 447–448. For this particular loan, she cites Ia. N. Shchapov, *Vizantiiskoe i iuzhnoslavianskoe pravovoe nasledie na Rusi v XI–XIII vv.*, Moscow, 1978, pp. 139–146.

⁵¹ Senyk, *A History of the Church in Ukraine*, p. 448.

and would have been a better place to mediate among the various Rus' principalities.⁵²

Thus, we see no real agreement in the historiography concerning the circumstances of the move. In particular, had Metropolitan Kirill previously moved to Volodimir? If so, then did he move back to Kiev? Why would the metropolitan move north to Volodimir instead of west to Galicia? And, finally, the question of “Tatar violence” (*nasilie*) has hardly been addressed at all. As Solov'ev asked, what was worse about the Tatar violence of 1299 than previously that provoked the metropolitan to move?

* * *

Most likely, the idea behind the move of the seat of the metropolitanate to the north was to get the head of the Rus' Church, the metropolitan, and the nominal Christian ruler of Rus', the grand prince, to reside in the same place,⁵³ just as the Patriarch of Constantinople resided in the same city as the Byzantine Emperor. The idea, which was expressed in the chronicles, that the metropolitan moved because Kiev had been made unsafe by “Tatar violence,”⁵⁴ which Golubinskii and others understood to mean “plundering” (*razgrablenie*)⁵⁵ would seem to be belied by

⁵² Senyk rightly points out that we should not assume that metropolitans Kirill and Maksim did not travel to Galicia and Volynia merely because the Galician-Volynian Chronicle does not report such travel. This chronicle tends to ignore the activities of Church prelates in general. Senyk, *A History of the Church in Ukraine*, pp. 444–445.

⁵³ From the Mongol invasion until 1326, the grand prince's ostensible residence was Volodimir. And the grand prince maintained “of Vladimir” as part of his title well into the fifteenth century.

⁵⁴ *PSRL*, vol. 1 (2nd ed.), col. 485. Compare *PSRL*, vol. 7, p. 182; *PSRL*, vol. 10, p. 172; *PSRL*, vol. 15 (2nd ed.), pt. 1, col. 35; *PSRL*, vol. 15 (2nd ed.), pt. 2, col. 407; *PSRL*, vol. 18, p. 84; *PSRL*, vol. 20, pt. 1, p. 172; *PSRL*, vol. 23, p. 95; *PSRL*, vol. 24, p. 106; *PSRL*, vol. 28, pp. 64, 223; *PSRL*, vol. 30, p. 99; *PSRL*, vol. 33, p. 77; *PSRL*, vol. 34, p. 104.

⁵⁵ Golubinskii, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, vol. 2, p. 95. The term *nasilie* can also mean oppression and coercion. See I. I. Sreznevskii, comp., *Materialy dlia slovaria drevne-russkogo iazyka po pis'mennym pamiatnikam*, 3 vols., St. Petersburg, 1893–1912, vol. 2, col. 230. Since the Church was neither oppressed nor coerced, it seems “violence” is the more likely meaning here. Such an understanding of *nasilie* in this context is supported by the evidence of a gloss on *nasilie tatarskoe* at this point in the text of the Mazurin Chronicle (see fn. 1 above): *radi tatarskiiia obidy i nepokoia* (because of Tatar enmities and disruptions).

two considerations. First, the metropolitan, at least officially, resided some fifty-nine years in Kiev after the sack of 1240 and traveled extensively throughout Rus' lands in apparent safety. Metropolitan Kirill's extensive traveling as head of the Rus' Church led the Church historian Filaret to remark that he "scarcely spent a year in one place."⁵⁶ Second, the northeast suffered frequent Mongol intrusions during this period. From 1273 to 1298, we have accounts of at least sixteen punitive raids by the Mongols on towns in the Northeast.⁵⁷ Volodimir, Moscow, and other towns in the northeast were sacked as late as 1293; Moscow was sacked again in 1298. If, as Vernadsky argued, Kiev was "completely devastated and unsuitable for the establishment of the diocesan administration," then Volodimir seems to have been no better off after its destruction in 1238.⁵⁸ The Mongols were no less violent in the north than they were in the south.

Much of the argument that Kiev was unsafe in the year 1299 is based on Carpini's description of Kiev in 1246: "Kiev . . . has been reduced almost to nothing, for there are at the present time scarce 200 houses there and the inhabitants are kept in complete servitude."⁵⁹ There is no other extant description of Kiev at this time, however, so there is no way to confirm Carpini's

⁵⁶ Filaret [Dmitrii G. Gumilevskii], *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., 5 vols., Moscow, 1849–1853, vol. 2, p. 126.

⁵⁷ Lawrence N. Langer, "The Medieval Russian Town," in *The City in Russian History*, ed. Michael F. Hamm, Lexington, KY, 1976, p. 15; V. V. Kargalov, *Vneshnepoliticheskie faktory razvitiia feodal'noi Rusi*, Moscow, 1967, p. 193.

⁵⁸ See A. N. Nasonov, *Mongoly i Rus' (Istoriia tatarskoi politiki na Rusi)*, Moscow and Leningrad, 1940, p. 39.

⁵⁹ Fr. Iohannes de Plano Carpini, "Ystoria Mongalorum," in *Sinica Franciscana*, vol. 1: *Itinera et relationes fratrum minorum saeculi XIII et XIV*, ed. P. Anastasius van den Wyngaert, Firenze, 1929, p. 72; and John of Plano Carpini, "History of the Mongols," in *The Mongol Mission: Narratives and Letters of the Franciscan Missionaries in Mongolia and China in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries*, ed. by Christopher Dawson, London, 1955, pp. 29–30. My translation of passages from Carpini's text follows but does not completely coincide with the translation found in *The Mongol Mission*. Cf. "Libellus historicus Joannis de Plano Carpini," in *The Principal Navigations Voyages Traffiques and Discoveries of the English Nation*, ed. Richard Hakluyt, 12 vols., Glasgow, 1903–1905, vol. 1, pp. 110–111 and 152–153. On the basis of Carpini's description, Cahun proposes that the Venetians prevailed upon the Mongols to destroy Kiev in order to eliminate a rival for trade in the Crimea. Léon Cahun, *Introduction a l'histoire de l'Asie: Turcs et Mongols des Origines à 1405*, Paris, 1896, pp. 349–350. For a survey of the arguments and rather inconclusive archaeological evidence concerning the impact of the Mongol sack of Kiev in 1240, see M. K. Karger, "Kiev i mongol'skoe zavoevanie," *Sovetskaia arkheologiya*, vol. 11, 1949, pp. 55–102.

description or indeed that he was describing Kiev or some other town he was told was Kiev. It is possible that the Mongols were aware of the quasi-military reconnaissance purpose of Carpini's mission and may have tried to deceive him.⁶⁰ There is no evidence in Carpini's account, such as a description of the Sophia Cathedral, that connects the town he saw with Kiev itself.⁶¹ On the other hand, Carpini may have seen a Kiev that was relatively undevastated, but disappointing in appearance when compared with Western cities, which were more densely populated.⁶² Besides, we do not find such a description of Kiev in the first redaction manuscript copies of Carpini's work.⁶³ In the following passage, the italicized part is an insertion of the second-redaction copies of his "History":

Subduing this country, they attacked Rus', where they made great havoc, destroying cities and fortresses and slaughtering men; and they laid siege to Kiev, the capital of Rus'; after they had besieged the city for a long time, they took it and put the inhabitants to death. *When we were journeying through that land we came across countless skulls and bones of dead men lying about on the ground. Kiev had been a very large and thickly populated town, but now it has been reduced almost*

⁶⁰ On the gathering of military information by Carpini to help an anti-Mongol alliance, see among others, James J. Zlatko, "The Union of Suzdal, 1222–1252," *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, vol. 8, 1957, pp. 45–47.

⁶¹ Compare, e.g., Lassota's extensive description of Kiev, which he passed through in 1594. *Habsburgs and Zaporozhian Cossacks. The Diary of Erich Lassota von Steblau*, trans. Orest Subtelny, ed. Lubomyr R. Wynar, Littleton, CO, 1975, pp. 74–78.

⁶² The conclusion that Kiev was less densely populated than western European towns and cities can be drawn from recent archaeological research. See, esp., P. P. Tolochko, *Kiev i kievskaia zemlia v epokhu feodal'noi razdroblennosti XII–XIII vekov*, Kiev, 1980, pp. 76–89. Tolochko, nonetheless, estimates Kiev's population at close to 50,000 by the year 1200. Likewise, William of Rubruck was unimpressed with the capital of the Mongol Empire when he first saw it. In his *Journey*, Rubruck states that Karakorum, "is not as large as the village of Saint Denis." "Itinerarium Willelmi de Rubruc," in *Sinica Franciscana*, vol. 1, p. 285; and "The Journey of William of Rubruck," in *The Mongol Mission*, p. 183. That was in the 1250's, however, shortly after construction of the capital had begun. By the 1270's, Marco Polo reported that Karakorum was "three miles in circumference." Marco Polo, *The Travels*, trans. Ronald Latham, London, Penguin, 1958, p. 92.

⁶³ "Ystoria Mongalorum," p. 72 (fn. a). See also Denis Sinor, "John of Plano Carpini's Return from the Mongols: New Light from a Luxemburg Manuscript," *Journal of Royal Asiatic Society*, 1957, p. 199.

to nothing, for there are at the present time scarce two hundred houses there and the inhabitants are kept in complete servitude. Going on from there, fighting as they went, the Tatars destroyed the whole of Rus’.

As one can see, without the italicized words, the text continues smoothly from “and put the inhabitants to death.” to “Going on from there. . .”. The passage that begins with “When we were journeying . . .” and ends with “in complete servitude” is a later insertion into Carpini’s text and creates a break in the narrative. One also notes the apparent dissonance between the first-redaction wording that the Mongols “put the inhabitants to death” and the second-redaction statement that “the inhabitants are kept in complete servitude.” One would have to conjecture that only some or even most of the inhabitants were put to death, and the rest kept in complete servitude. But then that changes the implication of the first-redaction narrative that all the inhabitants were put to death.

But, let us allow for the sake of further argument that Carpini wrote this passage and that he was accurately describing Kiev in 1246. If Carpini did see a devastated Kiev, then that would create a situation where the Tatars were raiding a town that was “reduced almost to nothing.” To be sure, this implied situation would reinforce the image the chroniclers tried to create of the Tatars being destructive and irrational. Yet, given the evidence we have about the Mongol Empire and its concern for international trade,⁶⁴ it would be a highly unlikely circumstance that they would continue to raid a town that had already been destroyed.

It might be possible to postulate an economically revived Kiev. That is, Kiev of the 1240’s and 1250’s may have been devastated, as reported in Carpini’s text, and unfit for diocesan

⁶⁴ See, e.g., the decree of Mengü-Temir to the prince of Novgorod ca. 1270 that “the merchant has free passage through my domain.” *Gramoty velikogo Novgoroda i Pskova*, ed. S. N. Valk, Moscow, 1949, p. 57. Also see, inter alia, Wilhelm Heyd, *Geschichte des Levantehandels im Mittelalter*, Stuttgart, 2 vols., 1879, vol. 2, pp. 77–78; and David Morgan, *The Mongols*, Oxford, 1986, pp. 101–102.

administration, as Vernadsky suggests. In this scenario, Metropolitan Kirill would have moved to Volodimir until the 1260's or 1270's when he would have returned to a revived Kiev. Metropolitan Maksim then moved back to Volodimir because of renewed Tatar attacks on this revived Kiev. Such a hypothesis could be supported by the point that from 1238 to 1274 no new bishop of Volodimir was appointed. That the metropolitan would have acted as the bishop of Volodimir during that period is evident from the chronicle entry for 1299 where it states that Maksim took over the eparchy of Volodimir and sent Semen who was then bishop of Volodimir to become bishop of Rostov.⁶⁵ This hypothesis would also counter Fuhrmann's objections to the argument that the metropolitan resided in the north, because the two chronicle entries he cites to show that the metropolitan traveled from Kiev are from the years 1274 and 1280, and the others I cited are from after 1274, that is, after this proposed return to Kiev.

On the other hand, it could be argued that the move from Kiev in 1299 may also have resulted from a decline in the commercial power of Kiev. For, when the Mongols established their administration over Rus', they also re-established the dominance of the Volga trade route over that of the Dnepr.⁶⁶ Given the shift of trade to the Volga route, on the one hand, and to the Sarai-Kaffa-Constantinople route, on the other, a revival of Kiev as a commercial center toward the end of the thirteenth century remains to be demonstrated. Indeed, the *Council Decision of 1354*, which refers to Kiev's impoverishment as a reason for the metropolitan's move, may accu-

⁶⁵ When the metropolitan began to reside in Moscow, he again appointed a bishop in the Volodimir eparchy. Pavel Stroev, *Spiski ierarkhov i nastoiatelei rossiiskie tserkvi*, St. Petersburg, 1877, col. 653. Later, on December 6, 1352, Metropolitan Feognost appointed Aleksei bishop in Volodimir as successor designate. Stroev, *Spiski ierarkhov*, cols. 653–654. See also *PSRL*, vol. 7, p. 217; *PSRL*, vol. 10, p. 225; *PSRL*, vol. 20, p. 187; *PSRL*, vol. 23, p. 111; *PSRL*, vol. 24, p. 121; *PSRL*, vol. 25, p. 179; *PSRL*, vol. 28, pp. 73, 234; *PSRL*, vol. 33, p. 78;

⁶⁶ Thomas S. Noonan, "Russia's Eastern Trade, 1150–1350: The Archeological Evidence," *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi*, vol. 3, 1983, pp. 201–264; Janet Martin, "The Land of Darkness and the Golden Horde: The Fur Trade under the Mongols, XIII–XIV Centuries," *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique*, vol. 19, 1978, pp. 401–422.

rately represent Kiev's economic status by the middle of the fourteenth century.⁶⁷ Again, if we accept second-redaction additions as the work of Carpini himself, then we have testimony that Kiev remained, at least until 1246, a stopping-off place for merchants who traveled to Rus':

In addition, there are as witnesses the merchants from Vratislavia, who accompanied us as far as Kiev. . . . and also many other merchants, both from Poland and from Austria, who arrived at Kiev after we had gone to the Tatars. Further witnesses are the merchants from Constantinople who came to Rus' via the Tatars and were in Kiev when we returned from the land of the Tatars. The names of these merchants are as follows: Michael the Genoese and Bartholomew, Manuel the Venetian, James Reverius of Acre, Nicolas Pisani, are the chief; the less important are: Mark, Henry, John, Vasius, another Henry Bonadies, Peter Paschami. There were many others. . . .⁶⁸

This passage would seem to indicate that Kiev must have retained some importance as a trading center, and not have been all that dangerous to live in immediately after the sack of 1240 if merchants from Constantinople, Genoa, Venice, Poland, and Austria were traveling there.⁶⁹ And it would seem to contradict the previously mentioned second-redaction addition that "Kiev . . . has been reduced almost to nothing." As a result of their dissonant nature in relation to the text of the first redaction, and as a result of my study of the other changes in the second redaction, I have come to the conclusion that neither passage is the work of Carpini, but of a subsequent editor who was trying to enhance Carpini's testimony.⁷⁰ In his description of Kiev, this editor

⁶⁷ *Russkaia istoricheskaia biblioteka*, vol. 6, supplement, cols. 63–66; and *Acta patriarchatus Constantinopolitani*, vol. 1, pp. 351–352.

⁶⁸ Carpini, "History of the Mongols," p. 71; "Ystoria mongalorum," p. 129.

⁶⁹ According to van den Wyngaert, Manuel the Venetian, James Reverius of Acre, and Nicolas Pisani were all from Venice. "Ystoria mongalorum," p. 129 fn. 2.

⁷⁰ For further discussion of this problem, see my "Second-Redaction Additions in Carpini's *Ystoria Mongalorum*," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, vol. 14, 1990, pp. 522–550.

probably wanted to emphasize the destructiveness of the Mongols, so he inserted descriptions of human bones by the roadside as well as the sorry plight of Kiev itself. The second-redaction editor used that same phrase in describing the land of the Kangli Turks and Cumans: “we came across many skulls and bones of dead men.”⁷¹ The reference to bones on the ground may have a factual basis, but not necessarily as human bones. Marco Polo reported that he saw, while traveling through Pamir, sheep bones and horns being used as cairns “to serve as landmarks to travellers in the snowy season.”⁷² It is possible the Mongols or other nomads brought the practice of using animal bones as landmarks west with them. In referring to witnesses, the editor would have been trying to support the authenticity of the description by providing names of merchants who had seen Carpini in Kiev. Thus, we have no direct evidence that indicates how extensively Kiev was affected by the sack of 1240 or that it was unsuitable for habitation. Indeed, if we eliminate the second-redaction additions, Carpini nowhere states that he visited Kiev at all.⁷³

The multiple-move hypothesis would seem to be a complicated one. In particular, if the metropolitan moved to Volodimir in the 1250’s, there seems to be no clear motivation for him to move back to Kiev in the 1260’s or 1270’s. Besides, the metropolitans do not seem to have abandoned Kiev all that easily. If it was clear already by the 1250’s that the grand prince, as the appointee of the Kipchak Khan, was residing in the north and Kirill and Maksim spent a large amount of time there, then it is also clear that the metropolitans were maintaining Kiev as their official residence, that is, as the religious capital, perhaps in hope that the political capital could be returned to Kiev (tradition played an important role in Rus’).

⁷¹ Carpini, “History of the Mongols,” p. 58; “Ystoria mongalorum,” p. 112.

⁷² Polo, *Travels*, p. 80. See also *The Book of Ser Marco Polo, the Venetian, Concerning the Kingdoms and the Marvels of the East*, ed. and trans. Henry Yule, 2 vols., 3rd ed., London, 1903, vol. 1, p. 176.

⁷³ We would, however, be able to conclude that he did pass through Kiev from the testimony of Benedict the Pole. See *Sinica Franciscana*, vol. 1, p. 135; and *The Mongol Mission*, p. 79. But, then, a second-redaction editor would have been able to conclude likewise.

To be sure, the only evidence we have of the metropolitan's activities between 1250 and 1274 concerns his activities in the north. The chronicles report that Kirill was in Volodimir in 1250, 1252, 1255, and 1263, and in Novgorod in 1256, but they do not mention his being in Kiev at all. To then conclude that Kirill resided continuously in Volodimir and not in Kiev is a specious use of the argument from silence. There is very little mention of Kiev in the chronicles in the decades immediately following the sack of 1240.⁷⁴ Nor do we have chronicles of this time from Kiev, which could mean either that no chronicle writing was being done in Kiev—evidence of the bad situation there—or that whatever chronicles were written there did not survive. We really cannot say which is the case.

* * *

It seems to me that the metropolitans would not leave Kiev unless they had to. Whatever destruction Kiev underwent in 1240, it was not enough to chase the metropolitan let alone the merchants or people of Kiev away permanently. Given that the Mongol khans protected all religions within their domains,⁷⁵ it would take a breakdown in that protection to force the metropolitan to leave Kiev. This hypothesis is speculative to be sure, but there may be some evidence to support it.

We have the testimony of Nikephoros Gregoras to the effect that southern Rus' at the end of

⁷⁴ The Galician-Volynian Chronicle makes only incidental mention of Kiev until 1259, then no mention at all through 1292. The Novgorod I Chronicle makes no mention of Kiev from 1246 through 1273. In the Laurentian Chronicle, there is only one incidental mention of Kiev from 1241 through 1298. The northeastern chronicles (Simeonov, Voskresensk, Volodimir, Moscow compilation of the end of the fifteenth century, Nikon, and so forth) make no mention of Kiev from 1250 through 1273.

⁷⁵ This policy derived from Genghis Khan's practice of religious toleration. See 'Aṭā Malik Juvainī, *The History of the World Conqueror*, trans. John Andrew Boyle, 2 vols., Manchester, 1958, vol. 1, p. 26. On the exemption of religious institutions in China under the Yüan from taxes, see Vernadsky, *The Mongols and Russia*, p. 84, esp. fn. 80 for relevant literature.

the thirteenth century was being devastated by the Mongols.⁷⁶ What Gregoras as well as the testimony of the chronicles concerning Tatar “violence,” may be referring to, is the so-called second war waged in the steppe south of Kiev between Nogai and Tokhta from 1299 to 1300.⁷⁷ This war ended in a victory for Tokhta at Kukanlyk (Kaganlyk), which Vernadsky identifies as the Kagamlyk River, a tributary of the Dnepr, in Poltava Province.⁷⁸ Vernadsky’s view about the location of the battle is not an uncontested one.⁷⁹ Yet, if Nogai’s and Tokhta’s armies were fighting each other in the area, then we would expect devastation and generally unsafe conditions to be the

⁷⁶ Nikephoros Gregoras, *Historiae Byzantinae*, 3 vols. ed. by Ludwig Schopen and Immanuel Bekker (CSHB, vols. 6–7, 48), Bonn, 1829–1855, vol. 3, pp. 513–516.

⁷⁷ Rashid al-din reported that in 698 A.H. (1298–1299), Tokhta gathered “nearly 30 *tumëns* [or 300,000 troops at full complement] on the [left] bank of the River Uzi” [Dnepr]. The following year, again according to Rashid al-din, Tokhta “crossed the Uzi with an army of 60 *tumëns*” (or 600,000 troops at full complement). Rashid al-din, *The Successors of Genghis Khan*, trans. John Andrew Boyle, New York, 1971, pp. 127–128. For a discussion of this steppe war, see C. d’Ohsson, *Histoire des Mongols. Depuis Tchinguiz-Khan jusqu’a Timour bey ou Tamerlane*, Amsterdam, 4 vols., 1834–1835, vol. 4, pp. 755–758; and N. I. Veselovskii, “Khan iz temnikov Zolotoi Ordy Nogai i ego vremia,” *Zapiski Rossiiskoi Akademii nauk*, 8th ser., vol. 13, 1922, pp. 48–49. See also V. G. Tiesenhausen (Tizengauzen), *Sbornik materialov, odnosiaschikhsia k istorii Zolotoi Ordy*, vol. 1, St. Petersburg, 1884, pp. 112–114, 122–123, 159. The date for the campaign of Tokhta supplied by Tiesenhausen, according to the Chronicle of Beybars by Rukn al-Din, is 699 A.H., that is, September 28, 1299, to September 16, 1300. On the conversion of Islamic years to Christian years, see E. I. Kamentseva, *Khronologiia*, Moscow, 1967, pp. 110–113 and table II. This year for the final events of the war leads me further to discount April 18 as the date when the move of the metropolitan was completed, unless April 18, 1300, was meant (see above fn. 1). On the other hand, the “second” steppe war may have been only a continuation of the “first” steppe war. That is, more or less continuous fighting may have been going on between Nogai and Tokhta from 1297 to 1300, where the reference to “699 A.H.” may represent only the year in which the decisive battle took place. If the latter is the case, then the date the metropolitan left Kiev represents approximately the time when the venue of the war, which had begun on the Don River, reached the area south of Kiev.

⁷⁸ Vernadsky, *The Mongols and Russia*, p. 188 and fn. 197. On the location of the Kagamlyk River, see P. P. Semenov, *Geograficheskoi slovar’ Rossiiskoi imperii*, 5 vols., St. Petersburg, 1863–1865, vol. 2, p. 409; and V. P. Semenov, *Rossiiia. Polnoe geograficheskoe opisanie nashego otechestva*, 18 vols., St. Petersburg, 1899–1914, vol. 7, pp. 311, 415, and 416.

⁷⁹ Bruun asserts that the battle was near where Odessa is located today. P. K. Bruun (F. K. Brun), “Chernomor’e. Sbornik issledovaniia po istoricheskoi geografii Iuzhnoi Rossii,” *Zapiski Imperatorskogo Novorossiiskogo universiteta*, vol. 30, Odessa, 1880, p. 356. Spuler places the battle at the Terek River in the Caucasus. Bertold Spuler, *Die Goldene Horde. Die Mongolen in Russland*, Leipzig, 1943, p. 76. On the other hand, Grousset is in agreement with Vernadsky that the battle was near the Dnepr. René Grousset, *The Empire of the Steppes: A History of Central Asia*, trans. Naomi Walford, New Brunswick, NJ, 1970, p. 403.

result. This conflict would seem a better interpretation of “Tatar violence” than punitive raids on Kiev, or Mongol hostility to the Rus’ Church, which it had been protecting for almost fifty years.⁸⁰ In a civil war, however, that protection could no longer be guaranteed.⁸¹ At least two other possibilities must be considered. First, Tokhta, the winner of the steppe war, may have wanted the head of the Rus’ Church located in the area he more clearly controlled, that is, north-eastern Rus’, rather than an area, Kiev, associated with his recently defeated foe Nogai. If Maksim moved at the behest of Tokhta, however, then that would leave the chronicler’s explanation, that it was because of violence, unaccounted for. One might also consider the impact of Lithuanian advances in the Kievan area as a component of the metropolitan’s decision. Kiev, during this period (at least until 1320), was in the “no man’s land” between the Duchy of Lithuania and the Kipchak Khanate. Yet, such an explanation would not account for the apparent precipitousness of the move in 1299.

⁸⁰ For the Mongol promise of protection to the Rus’ Church, see V. A. Kuchkin, “Skazanie o smerti mitropolita Petra,” *Trudy Otdela drevnerusskoi literatury (TODRL)*, vol. 18, 1962, p. 77. The *iarlyki* contained the stipulation to the metropolitans that the clergy should pray for the well-being of the khans and their families. In return, the khans extended their protection to the Rus’ Church and exempted it from taxation. Cf. *PSRL*, vol. 1, cols. 474–475, 524. On the *iarlyki*, see, e.g., M. D. Priselkov, *Khanskie iarlyki russkim mitropolitam*, St. Petersburg, 1916, esp., pp. 96–98 for the text of the *iarlyk* from Khan Mengu-Temir in 1267; *Pamiatniki russkogo prava*, 5 vols., ed. L. V. Cherepnin, Moscow, 1955, vol. 3: *Pamiatniki prava perioda obrazovaniia russkogo tsentralizovannogo gosudarstva XIV–XV vv.*, pp. 467–468; and more recently A. I. Pliguzov, “Kratkoe sobranie iarlykov ordynskikh khanov, dannykh russkim mitropolitam i dukhovenstvu,” in *Russkii feodal’nyi arkhiv*, 5 vols., Moscow, 1986–1992, vol. 3, pp. 585–594, esp. pp. 588–589, concerning tax exemptions and other economic guarantees. See also Nasonov, *Mongoly i Rus’*, pp. 14–15; G. A. Fedorov-Davydov, *Obshchestvennyi stroi Zolotoi Ordy*, Moscow, 1973, pp. 34–35; and Meyendorff, *Byzantium and the Rise of Russia*, p. 45. See also the recent article by Sergei Hackal, “Under Pressure from the Pagans?—The Mongols and the Russian Church,” in *The Legacy of St. Vladimir: Byzantium, Russia, America*, eds. J. Breck, J. Meyendorff, and E. Silk, Crestwood, NY, 1990, pp. 47–56 (although this article should be used with especial caution).

⁸¹ Marco Polo reported that, in 1262, when war broke out between Berke and Hülegü, “no one could travel about the country without the risk of arrest.” Polo, *Travels*, p. 34. On the war between Hülegü and Berke, see David Nicolle, *The Mongol Warlords: Genghis Khan, Kublai Khan, Hülegü, Tamerlane*, Poole, England, Firebird, 1990, pp. 118–120. Jackson places the war in 1261. See P. Jackson, “The Dissolution of the Mongol Empire,” *Central Asiatic Journal*, vol. 22, 1978, pp. 233–234.

There seems to be evidence that the metropolitan's decision to move was a relatively sudden one. In 1295, he appointed Semen as the new bishop of Volodimir.⁸² If the metropolitan was planning a move to Volodimir, then it is not likely that he would appoint a new bishop there, only to oust him five years later and take over his diocese.⁸³ He could have more easily moved immediately to Volodimir in 1295 while the see was vacant. In addition, the chronicle entry provides at least two indications that the move was not well thought out in advance. First, the entry states that "the metropolitan went from Kiev to Briansk, and from Briansk he went to the Suzdalian land."⁸⁴ The mention of Briansk is unnecessary unless the chronicler wanted to indicate that the metropolitan spent some time there, perhaps deciding where to go, or whether or not to return to Kiev. The second indication of indecision is the statement in the entry for 1299 in the Novgorod I Chronicle. The people of Novgorod with their prince had nominated a new archbishop, Feoktist. They wanted the metropolitan's blessing, so "they petitioned him [Maksim] and seated him [Feoktist] at the bishop's court until they found out where Maksim, Metropolitan of Kiev and all Rus' was."⁸⁵ The residence of the metropolitan would not seem to have been a question if the metropolitan was at that time located in Volodimir and had been so since the 1250's. Nor would it seem to have been a problem if the metropolitan had been spending most of his time in the north in Volodimir.

The most likely explanation is that the metropolitan resided both officially and unofficially in Kiev until the year 1299. At that time, the metropolitan made a sudden decision to leave Kiev, apparently without a clear notion of his destination. He headed north because the main area of

⁸² Stroev, *Spiski ierarkhov*, col. 653.

⁸³ *PSRL*, vol. 1 (2nd ed.), col. 485; *PSRL*, vol. 7, p. 182; *PSRL*, vol. 10, p. 171. Semen was made bishop of Rostov and Iaroslavl', which eparchy had been vacant since 1295. Stroev, *Spiski ierarkhov*, col. 326.

⁸⁴ *PSRL*, vol. 1 (2nd ed.), col. 485; *PSRL*, vol. 10, p. 172; *PSRL*, vol. 18, p. 84.

⁸⁵ *NPL*, pp. 90, 330. See also *PSRL*, vol. 10, p. 172.

conflict of the steppe war between Nogai and Tokhta was in the south.⁸⁶ He could have headed west to Galicia, but then the Lithuanians, who were still pagans, might not have allowed him and his entourage through. Besides, even if he had reached Galicia, he would have been cut off from the larger part of Rus' and its grand prince by the Lithuanians. On the other hand, it may be of some significance that when it came time to make the decision to leave Kiev, the metropolitan was someone, Maksim, who did not owe his nomination to the Galician prince. Such a lack of connection with Galicia may have made his decision to move north easier and established a precedent for his successor, Peter, who although nominated by the Galician prince, continued the metropolitan's residence in the north.

Considerations of Byzantine Church policy may also have entered into the metropolitan's decision. After the determination was made in Nicaea in the late 1240's to cooperate with the Kipchak Khanate, a policy that remained generally in effect throughout the late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries,⁸⁷ it was incumbent on the metropolitan to work with the khan's appointee as ruler in Rus' (the grand prince), and *not* to foment opposition from Galicia. The head of the Rus' Church was obliged to obey the policies of the Byzantine Church. The north, which was safe, not so much from Mongol punitive expeditions, but from the devastations of all-out steppe

⁸⁶ Such a decision would parallel that of Niccolò and Maffeo Polo, the father and uncle, respectively, of Marco, who 37 years earlier decided to travel east from Sarai because they could not travel west where the war between Berke and Hülegü was being fought. Polo, *Travels*, pp. 34–35.

⁸⁷ Two exceptions to the policy of friendly relations are the alliance of the Kipchak Khanate and Bulgarians against Byzantium and the Ilkhanate of Persia in 1264–1265 and the Venetian-Genoese War of 1348, in which Genoa allied with the Khanate against Byzantium and Venice. On the alliance of 1264–1265, see George Vernadsky, "Zolotaia orda, Egipet i Vizantiia v ikh vzaimootnosheniakh v tsarstvovanie Mikhaila Paleologa," *Sbornik statei po arkheologii i vizantinovedeniiu izdavaemyi Seminariem imeni N. P. Kondakova*, Prague, 1927, p. 79; Vernadsky, *The Mongols and Russia*, pp. 162–163; Spuler, *Die Goldene Horde*, pp. 47–48; and P. Nikov, *Tataro-bulgarski otnosheniia*, Sofia, 1921, pp. 6–8. On the Venetian-Genoese War, see Costas P. Kyrris, "John Cantacuzenus, the Genoese, the Venetians, and the Catalans (1348–1354)," *Byzantina*, vol. 4, 1972, pp. 333–336. The shift in Byzantine policy seems to have resulted from the Genoese capture of Chios and several other locations nearby, which gave Genoa control of the Hellespont Straits, and thus of the western outlet of Black Sea trade. Byzantium was not in a position to expel the Genoese from these strong points, at least not without Venetian help.

warfare, whether between Mongol armies or between the Mongols and Lithuanians, was a logical choice for the metropolitan to choose.

Then the decision had to be made exactly where in the north to set up the new official residence of the metropolitan. As far as the Byzantine Church was concerned, it did not much matter in which town the metropolitan of Rus' resided;⁸⁸ his duties covered the entire Rus' land. If the political capital was no longer in Kiev, but in Volodimir, then the most likely place for the metropolitan would be where the political ruler resided, at least ostensibly.⁸⁹ The move also had a symbolic meaning. Although the metropolitan maintained the title "of Kiev and all Rus'" until the middle of the fifteenth century,⁹⁰ the move effectively meant the end of the hope, if any remained, that Kiev would soon once again be both the political *and* religious capital of Rus'. We continue to see the effects of that decision "to this day" as the chroniclers would have put it.

⁸⁸ One thinks in particular of the decision of the Church Council of 1380, which states that the metropolitan in Moscow must use the designation "of Kiev and Great Rus'." That decision seems to have had nothing to do with where the metropolitan actually resided, but rather with the hope that the two metropolitanates, that of Mega Rus', on the one side, and that of Lithuania and Micro Rus', on the other, would soon be reunited. See Meyendorff, *Byzantium and the Rise of Russia*, pp. 214–221. The decision of the council can be found in *Russkaia istoricheskaia biblioteka*, vol. 6, supplement, cols. 165–183; and in *Acta patriarchatus Constantinopolitani*, vol. 2, pp. 12–18.

⁸⁹ Although the Nikon Chronicle reports that Petr, when he was first chosen metropolitan, "resided" (*siade*) briefly in Kiev in 1308 (*PSRL*, vol. 10, p. 176), other, earlier chronicles report that he merely went there after being consecrated and before continuing on to Volodimir. See *PSRL*, vol. 7, p. 185; *PSRL*, vol. 20, p. 173; *PSRL*, vol. 23, p. 97; *PSRL*, vol. 25, p. 159; *PSRL*, vol. 28, p. 224; *PSRL*, vol. 30, p. 101.

⁹⁰ Stroev, *Spiski ierarkhov*, col. 3. See also Andrei Pliguzov, "On the Title 'Metropolitan of Kiev and All Rus','" *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, vol. 15, 1991, p. 342; and idem, "O titule 'Mitropolit Kievskii i vseia Rusi,'" *Russkii feodal'nyi arkhiv*, vol. 5, pp. 1034–1042.